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Sharks and Minnows in the War
on Drugs: A Study of Quantity, Race
and Drug Type in Drug Arrests
Joseph E. Kennedy,†* Isaac Unah,** & Kasi Wahlers***
Conventional wisdom has it that in the war on drugs you have to catch
small fish in order to catch big fish. But what if the vast majority of drug
arrests were for very small fish, and disproportionately brown ones at
that? This Article is the first to conclusively establish that the war on
drugs is being waged primarily against those possessing or selling
minuscule amounts of drugs. Two out of three drug offenders arrested by
non-federal law enforcement possess or sell a gram or less at the time of
arrest. Furthermore, about 40% of arrests for hard drugs such as cocaine,
heroin, and meth/amphetamine are for trace amounts — a quarter of a
gram or less. These findings are the result of a first of its kind study of
drug arrest data from National Incident-Based Reporting System
(“NIBRS”) that analyzed all drug arrests reported for the years 2004,
2008, and 2012. The resulting data set contained over a million cases, and
useable quantity data was found in over 700,000 cases, making this study
the most comprehensive study of drug arrest quantity undertaken to date
by orders of magnitude.
† Copyright © 2018 Joseph E. Kennedy, Isaac Unah & Kasi Wahlers. This project
benefited greatly from helpful suggestions by Noah Painter Davis, Carissa Hessick, Eisha
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Everett Law Library for assistance in preparation of the graphs used.
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This Article also challenges assumptions that the disproportionate
representation of offenders of color among those incarcerated for drug
offenses results from their greater involvement in selling larger quantities
of drugs. Offenders of color are by and large not more serious offenders in
terms of quantity. They just possess and sell drugs that are the most
frequent target of arrest. Blacks are disproportionately arrested overall
because we arrest more for “Black drugs” than for “White drugs.” Racial
disparities might vanish or reverse if we were to make as many meth/
amphetamine and heroin arrests as crack cocaine arrests.
After confirming that felony liability is typically triggered for selling —
and in the case of hard drugs even possessing — such minuscule amounts,
this Article argues that such offenses should be downgraded to
misdemeanors for political, criminological and philosophical reasons.
Such liability is doubly unjust in light of the racial disparities revealed in
the patterns of arrest. A drug war premised on hunting great white sharks
instead scoops up mostly minnows, and disproportionately ones of color.
Felony liability for the two-thirds of offenders arrested for these gram-orless amounts should be eliminated.
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INTRODUCTION
In the long-running television drama “Breaking Bad,” viewers
watched the moral devolution of Walter White, a cancer-stricken high
school chemistry teacher who tried to provide for the financial future
of his family by cooking methamphetamine.1 He changed from a good
man caught in a bad situation into a sociopathic offender who ruled
over a crystal meth empire in order to achieve a measure of success
that had eluded him in his earlier life. In many ways, Walter White
became a poster child for the sort of drug offender that justified
serious punishment. He earned enormous amounts of money by
producing and distributing vast amounts of very harmful drugs. He
killed people in order to protect that enterprise. He freely chose to
continue in the drug trade for reasons of profit and power even after
having earned enough money to secure his family’s financial future.
Our drug laws are designed for offenders like Walter White. They
presume drug dealers to be dedicated criminals who are motivated by
the huge profits they reap from selling highly harmful substances and
who readily use violence to maintain those profits.2 To deter such
highly motivated and blameworthy offenders, virtually all states
impose felony liability and possible prison sentences for the sale of any
amount of illegal drugs as well as felony liability for even the simple
possession of hard drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and meth/
amphetamines.3 While many recognize that those who simply use
drugs should not be punished as severely as those who sell drugs,
felony liability for drug possession is justified in part as a means to the
end of convicting the more culpable and dangerous “drug dealers.”
The thinking is that you cannot catch the big fish without catching
some minnows as well.
What this Article conclusively establishes for the first time is that
roughly two out of every three arrests by state and local law
1 See generally Breaking Bad (AMC television broadcast Jan. 20, 2008–Sept. 29,
2013).
2 See infra Part III.
3 See infra Part III.

732

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:729

enforcement in our ongoing war on drugs are minnows; the number of
truly big fish in the remaining arrests is minuscule. Specifically, about
40% of drug arrests are for possessing or selling a quarter of a gram or
less, and about 20% of arrests for possession or sale are between onequarter of a gram and one gram.4 The arrests for various quantities
above one gram range over the single digits with arrests for a kilogram
or more being less than one percent.5 We do not seem to be using
minnows to catch big fish. Instead, we are catching mainly minnows,
occasionally slightly larger fish, and only very rarely a big fish.6

4

See infra Part II.
These findings are largely consistent with studies of drugs found in vehicle stops but
diverge sharply from a study that relied on data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 1997
Survey of Inmates in Federal and State Correctional Facilities. See Eric L. Sevigny &
Jonathan P. Caulkins, Kingpins or Mules: An Analysis of Drug Offenders Incarcerated in
Federal and State Prisons, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401 (2004); see also JOHN F.
PFAFF, LOCKED IN 33-36 (2017) (referencing the Sevigny and Caulkins article to refute the
“myth of the low-level, nonviolent drug offender”). Sevigny and Caulkins find that only
5.7% of state inmates can be described as “unambiguously low level.” Sevigny & Caulkins,
supra note 5, at 401. Such a finding might suggest that low quantity arrestees are rarely
incarcerated, but the limitations of the survey data upon which they rely are significant.
The total sample upon which they relied was slightly under 5000 and largely relied on
accurate self-reporting by the inmates sampled. See id. at 406-07. Their findings, moreover,
conflict with other studies relying on inmate surveys that reach very different conclusions.
See, e.g., RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DISTORTED PRIORITIES:
DRUG OFFENDERS IN STATE PRISONS 14 (2002), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Distorted-Priorities-Drug-Offenders-in-State-Prisons.pdf (finding
that 58% of all state prison inmates were minor role offenders).
Findings from studies of vehicle stop data, although limited in scope, are consistent
with the small quantities found in our NIBRS data. Samuel Gross and Katherine
Barnes studied vehicle stop data collected from 1995 to 2000 by the Maryland State
Police pursuant to a court order in a federal civil rights class action alleging racial
profiling. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and
Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 658, 658 n.22 (2002). Their
study focused particularly on stops on Interstate Highway 95, a route long believed to
be a major artery for the distribution of illegal drugs. Id. at 658-59. Gross and Barnes
found that the majority of drugs found for all racial groups were trace amounts or
amounts consistent with personal use rather than sale. Id. at 660.
Finally, those directly studying state and local drug enforcement efforts have made
observations consistent with our findings. See Kip Schlegel & Edmund F. McGarrell,
An Examination of Arrest Practices in Regions Served by Multijurisdictional Drug Task
Forces, 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 408, 409 (1992) (reporting that most law enforcement
agencies do not have the resources to effectively move beyond the user level).
6 Quantities in federal law enforcement drug arrests are undoubtedly higher, but
federal arrests are a small fraction of total drug arrests. For example, in 2012 the DEA
arrested 30,476 drug offenders while state and local law enforcement arrested
1,328,457 in that same year. LISA N. SACCO, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 16 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43749.pdf.
5
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Furthermore, this Article also reveals something important about
the nature of the racial disparities that plague the criminal justice
system. The racial distribution of these small quantity arrests drives
massive racial disparities in the war on drugs. Our data confirms that
Blacks are disproportionately arrested for crack cocaine offenses and
Whites for meth/amphetamine and heroin offenses.7 What has not
been demonstrated until now, however, is that these racial disparities
are not the result of greater involvement in the selling and distribution
of drugs by Blacks and Hispanics. There are just as many minnows
among Blacks as among Whites; we are just arresting a lot more of the
Black minnows.
Finally, this Article makes an additional empirical contribution to
our understanding of drug arrests. The vast majority of drug arrests
are not for hard drugs but for marijuana. Once again, the majority of
those arrests are for tiny quantities, and once again Blacks seem to be
disproportionately arrested for marijuana offenses relative to their
share of the overall population.
In sum, the majority of arrests for each drug individually are for
very small quantities. The majority of drug arrests, in general, are for
marijuana — the least harmful drug — not for cocaine, heroin, or
meth/amphetamine. The majority of arrests overall are for very small
quantities of marijuana, and the majority of the remaining arrests are
for very small quantities of hard drugs. Racial disparities are not just
preserved but magnified throughout. The overwhelming majority of
drug arrestees in state court are not “great white sharks” but small
brown minnows in more than one sense. Simply put, the drug war is
not being waged against those who are “breaking bad” but those who
are “breaking pitiful.”
One would expect that there would be more sharks than minnows
in the pool of drug offenders because illegal drugs are ultimately sold
in small quantities to users. But, there are far more small fish and far
fewer big fish than one would expect to see in what has been sold to
the public as a war on drug dealers. We are not catching small fish to
catch the big fish; we are spending most of our resources catching
small fish and only occasionally catching big fish.
Previous attempts to discern the quantities of drugs involved in state
court drug arrests have been limited by the absence of readily available
data. Police departments operate under no mandate to report drug
arrest quantities. Previous studies have principally drawn on two sets
of data: (1) periodic surveys of prison inmates, and (2) data collected
7

See infra Part II.B.
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on traffic stops as a result of consent decrees in lawsuits for racial
profiling. Both data sets are relatively small and inevitably involve
certain methodological biases.8 The only national database collecting
drug arrest quantity data is the U.S. Department of Justice’s National
Incident Based Reporting System (“NIBRS”), a voluntary reporting
program which began in the early nineties.9 Initially, the number of
agencies reporting was small but grew over the course of the nineties.
By 2004, 6,784 agencies from twenty-nine states reported data.10
The findings in our study using this dataset with respect to the race,
quantity, and drug type raise profound questions about the ongoing
war on drugs. The authors draw a straightforward, albeit controversial,
conclusion from these findings: given that the war on drugs is waged
mostly in a racially disparate way against the most minor offenders,
felony liability is not justified. Condemning someone to the status of a
felon for selling or possessing an amount of drugs that range anywhere
8 See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Targeting Young Men of Color for Search
and Arrest During Traffic Stops: Evidence From North Carolina 2002-13, 5 POL. GROUPS
& IDENTITIES 107 (2016) (relying only on data from search and arrests from traffic
stops in North Carolina); Gross & Barnes, supra note 5, at 658-59 (relying only on
data from vehicle stops by Maryland State Police that was reported pursuant to a
court-supervised settlement of a civil rights lawsuit); Sevigny & Caulkins, supra note
5, at 406-07 (relying only on self-reported data from inmates).
9 NIBRS Overview, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs-overview (last visited Sept.
5, 2018).
10 See Status of NIBRS in the States, INCIDENT BASED REPORTING RESOURCE CTR.,
http://www.jrsa.org/ibrrc/background-status/nibrs-states.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2018) [hereinafter Status of NIBRS].
NIBRS data has long been used to study a variety of criminological questions. No
use of the drug quantity data has previously been made, despite the fact that the data
reported also includes the race and gender of the offender. Focusing on the
presidential election years 2004, 2008, and 2012, the authors extracted all reported
drug arrests from the data set with useable data. With over 1.2 million cases processed
during the study period, there were over 700,000 cases containing useable drug
quantity data. This “big data” then constitutes everything that is known about the
quantities involved in reported drug cases for the three years in question.
The authors cross-checked the findings from this large data set against the smaller
set of data from those fifteen states that mandated 100% reporting from law
enforcement agencies in their jurisdictions in order to assess the representativeness of
the data and found that the trends described were largely consistent. A comparison of
data from each of the three years studied also determined that these findings were
stable over time. Finally, data from large cities was separated out from the larger set to
assess whether the failure of large population cities to participate skewed the results.
All of these comparisons yielded negligible differences, suggesting that the large data
set is a representative one despite the voluntary nature of NIBRS participation. The
bottom line is that this data set of over half a million cases is the most reliable and
comprehensive picture of state court drug arrests ever produced.
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between $10 and $50 is neither efficient nor just. Such offenses should
either not be prosecuted at all or should only be prosecuted as
misdemeanors.
Punishing those who sell illegal drugs or possess hard drugs in even
the smallest amount as felons may seem natural because it has been
done for so long and to so many. It requires some imagination to
consider the idea that a “drug dealer” should not be considered a
felon. But the fact that two out of every three drug offenders possess a
gram or less at the time of arrest, that two out of every five possess a
quarter of a gram or less, and that very few are arrested with more
than five grams all suggest that we are not arresting true “drug
dealers” but lesser offenders who do not truly merit felony liability.11
The thought that over the last few decades millions of offenders have
received felony convictions who do not truly deserve them will not be
an easy one to accept for those who have participated in this effort.
But, in light of the tiny quantities of arrests revealed, this is a “theemperor-does-not-have-clothes” moment: we cannot be afraid to point
out the obvious, even when it is uncomfortable to do so.12 We can no
longer pretend that we are seeing serious crime deserving felony
punishment in gram-or-less offenses.
Part I of this Article describes in detail the methodology used to
create the data set, including links to resources through which others
can validate the findings. Part II analyzes the data in terms of: (1) type
of drug, (2) quantity of drug, and (3) race of the offender. Part III
establishes that the legal consequences of gram-or-less possession are
likely felony liability with prison time for repeat offenses. Part IV
assesses the culpability of gram-or-less offenders by considering the
street value of these small amounts and concludes that they are
consistent with either personal consumption or very low-level
involvement in the drug trade. Part IV further addresses counterarguments to these conclusions. The Conclusion offers suggestions for
additional study.

11

See infra Part II.
In Hans Christian Andersen’s story, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” two weavers
claim to have woven a suit of clothes for the Emperor that can be seen by all but the
stupid. See generally HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSON, THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES (1837)
(illustrating that as the emperor walks around naked, everyone pretends to see the
clothes to avoid being viewed as stupid, except for a small child who has the courage
to point out the obvious).
12
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METHODOLOGY

The research reported in this paper is based on data for crimes
reported to the police from the NIBRS.13 For each criminal incident,
NIBRS captures information on offenses, victims, offenders, property,
persons arrested, and information about the incident itself. NIBRS data
is compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, a branch of the U.S.
Department of Justice.14 NIBRS data represents a new generation of
crime data, with the intent being to eventually “replace” the now
nearly eighty-five-year-old Uniform Crime Reports.15
This Part describes the methodology of this study and proceeds in
four sections: first, describing the NIBRS dataset; second, outlining
which portion of the available NIBRS data this study analyzes; third,
identifying the software used to generate meaningful insight into drug
cases; and fourth, detailing how race and ethnicity variables were
addressed.
A. Description of NIBRS Data
This study focused on drug arrests by non-federal law enforcement
agencies. NIBRS data provides detailed information on illicit drug and
other offenses, including the type and quantity of drugs involved,
nature of the arrest, and the race and ethnicity of the offender. The
detailed nature of this data allows us to explore the prevalence of drug
13 NIBRS data is publicly available for download. See National Incident-Based
Reporting System (NIBRS) Series, NACJD, https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
NACJD/series/128 (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). All data files underlying the analysis
contained in this Article are on file with the UC Davis Law Review and will be made
available so that researchers may replicate our results. Joseph Kennedy & Isaac Unah,
Excel Spreadsheet (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
Uniform Crime Report Statistics do not provide information about the quantity of
drugs involved in a contact or arrest.
14 A major impetus for the creation of the NIBRS data back in the late 1980s was
to provide law enforcement, the media, and academic researchers with more high
quality, detailed, and timely information about the nature of offense incidents than
had been provided in traditional Uniform Crime Report statistics. Howard N. Snyder,
Dissecting Crime Statistics, 12 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 77, 79-80 (2010); FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM VOLUME 1: DATA
COLLECTION GUIDELINES 1 (2000), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/nibrs/manuals/v1all.pdf
[hereinafter NIBRS VOLUME 1].
15 Stewart J. D’Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg, Race and the Probability of Arrest, 81
SOC. FORCES 1381, 1384 (2003). For a summary of the differences between the
traditional Uniform Crime Reports and NIBRS data, see NIBRS Overview, supra note 9
(unlike data reported through UCR’s traditional Summary System — an aggregate
monthly tally of crimes — the NIBRS data goes much deeper because of its ability to
provide circumstances and context for crimes).
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arrests, the quantities that lead to the arrest, and racial and ethnic
differences among those involved in drug arrests. Notably, a field is
included indicating whether an arrest was made. All cases in which
arrests were not made were analyzed separately.
We rely on NIBRS single-incident extract files for our analysis of
drug arrests. These files were created by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”) from an
original and structurally more complex NIBRS database.16 The reason
for creating these extract files is simply to make NIBRS data more
accessible and thereby encouraging wider usage and understanding of
the data. The extract files merge various NIBRS segments (e.g.,
arrestee, offender, value of the property involved, offense) within a
limit of three records per incident (i.e., maximum of three offenses per
incident, maximum of three locations, maximum of three offenders,
maximum of three arrestees, etc.) The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) defines an incident as “one or more offenses committed by the
same offender or group of offenders acting in concert, at the same time
and place.”17 In instances where there are more than three records, the
records greater than three are not included in NIBRS. The vast
majority of offenses have only one record. Indeed, for our purposes,
following the lead of other researchers,18 our analysis is limited to the
first record for each variable because this corresponds most closely to
the Uniform Crime Report counts.19
Over the past several years, NIBRS data has been gaining in
prominence as an alternative “semi-national” source of crime data —
“semi-national” because not all states are certified NIBRS participants.
Participating in NIBRS is entirely voluntary. States must be certified by
the FBI through a lengthy process before they can participate in
NIBRS.20 Even within participating states, not all police departments
choose to report crime data through NIBRS because of the high cost of
collecting such micro-level data. As such, NIBRS tends to represent
16 See National Incident-Based Reporting Resource Guide, NACJD, https://www.
icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/NIBRS/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).
17 NIBRS VOLUME 1, supra note 14, at 17 (emphasis omitted).
18 See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier, Casey T. Harris & Noah Painter-Davis, Gender
and Arrests for Larceny, Fraud, Forgery, and Embezzlement: Conventional or
Occupational Property Crime Offenders?, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 205, 214 (2015).
19 For a detailed review of NIBRS data, see generally Lynn A. Addington, Studying
the Crime Problem with NIBRS Data: Current Uses and Future Trends, in HANDBOOK ON
CRIME AND DEVIANCE 23 (Marvin D. Krohn et al. eds., 2007); Yoshio Akiyama & James
Nolan, Methods for Understanding and Analyzing NIBRS Data, 15 J QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 225 (1999).
20 See NIBRS VOLUME 1 supra note 14, at 4.
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smaller population areas.21 Fortunately, participation by states is
growing, even among large states and large urban jurisdictions. NIBRS
now covers thirty-seven states, representing approximately 30% of the
U.S. population and 28% of all reported crimes.22 Furthermore, fifteen
states have mandated 100% participation for their police agencies.23
To assess whether the voluntary nature of NIBRS participation and
the failure of large cities to participate may affect our conclusions, we
compared in our analysis data from the fifteen states that mandated
100% participation for their police agencies to the larger sample and
found no notable differences. We also compared data from core cities
to other regions within the larger data set and again found no notable
differences.24 We excluded from our analysis cases where no arrest
was made.25
B. Portions of NIBRS Data Analyzed
We limited our analysis of drug arrest data to recent presidential
election years: 2004, 2008, and 2012 because of limitation in
computing space.26 We extracted drug cases from these three
individual years and merged the resulting data into a large composite
file containing over 1.1 million cases.
Drug quantity was re-coded to establish a uniform, consistent, and
reliable unit of measurement.27 NIBRS quantity data is measured in
three ways: (1) weight, (2) capacity, and (3) unit.28 Drugs that are
measured in weight can appear in grams, kilograms, ounces, or
pounds. Drugs that are measured in capacity can appear in milliliters,
21 For example, no police agency covering a population of over one million
participated in NIBRS as of 2007. Addington, supra note 19, at 28.
22 Id.; Data Collection: National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=301 (last visited
Sept. 5, 2018).
23 See Status of NIBRS, supra note 10.
24 Kennedy & Unah, supra note 13, at tab 8.
25 Id. at tab 4.
26 Although the Federal Government started collecting NIBRS data in 1991, we
did not study data from the 1990s because the initial participation by states and
reporting agencies was low, making the resulting data set both smaller and less
representative.
27 NIBRS’s raw data must be “cleaned” in order to be analyzed. This process calls
for re-coding most of the variables to account for circumstances where information is
missing, unknown, or not applicable.
28 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2019 NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING
SYSTEM USER MANUAL 112-13 (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/nibrs-user-manual/view
[hereinafter NIBRS USER MANUAL].
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liters, fluid ounces, or gallons. Finally, drugs that are measured in
units can appear in dosage units or number of plants. We converted
the measurement units into grams since most police and media
reporting of drugs seizures and arrest are done in grams.29 When
liquid drugs are reported in NIBRS, the density of liquid drugs is not
reported.30 This makes it impossible to convert liquid drugs into
grams. As such, we limited our analysis to drugs measured by weight
since only these can be converted into grams.31 Fortunately, as Table 1
shows below, most illicit drugs are indeed measured in weight.32
Starting with our initial set of approximately 1.2 million drug cases,
we excluded cases where the drug measurement type was
undetermined (265 cases), unknown or missing (83,398 cases), or not
applicable (241,411 cases).33 For the remaining cases where the drug
measurement type is known and reported, we excluded cases where
the measurement is in capacities such as milliliter (1,123 cases), liter
(161 cases), fluid ounce (1,526 cases), gallon (692 cases) and those
where the measurement is in units, including dosage units (146,446
cases), and number of plants (8,435). The remaining cases totaled
705,963.34
The cases in the box within the table below are the ones included in
our analysis. They represent 82% of all the drug cases where a
measurement type is known and available in the NIBRS database.

29 See, e.g., Michelle Tsai, How Much for All That Heroin, SLATE (May 24, 2007, 6:40
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2007/05/how_much_for_
all_that_heroin.html.
30 See NIBRS USER MANUAL supra note 28, at 113.
31 We used the following conversion protocol to convert drugs from their original
measure into grams: a gram translates into a gram; an ounce translates into 28.3495
grams; a kilogram translates into 1000 grams; a pound translates into 453.592 grams.
32 See infra Table 1.
33 We surmise that in these cases no quantity of drugs was seized at the time of
arrest.
34 See data files on file with law review. Kennedy & Unah, supra note 13.
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Table 1. Frequency of Drug Measurement Type
Undetermined
Unknown/Missing
Not applicable
Gram
Kilogram
Ounce
Pound
Milliliter
Liter
Fluid Ounce
Gallon
Dosage Unit/Items

Cases
265
83,398
241,411
624,209
13,943
62,400
5,414
1,123
161
1,526
692
146,446

Percent
0.0%
7.0%
20.3%
52.5%
1.2%
5.2%
0.5%
0.1%
0.0%
0.1%
0.1%
12.3%

Number of Plants
Total

8,435
1,189,423

0.7%
100.0

C. Generating Drug Quantities
To generate the drug quantities herein reported, we used SPSS
statistical software to select cases that met certain specified criteria
(e.g., case where an arrest was made and the race of arrestee is nonHispanic white, etc.). The resulting cases are then displayed based on
drug type. The process is repeated for each racial or ethnic group
category.
D. Uniquely Identifying Drug Arrestees Based on Race and Ethnicity
NIBRS data includes separate variables for the race and ethnicity of
arrestees.35 One criticism of NIBRS data is that treating race and
ethnicity as two separate variables complicates matters by increasing
the risk of over-counting arrestees based on their race and ethnic
identification. For example, a specific White arrestee may be identified
as White (in the race variable) and as Hispanic (in the ethnicity

35 The first is “race of arrestee” coded as 1 = White (representing 53.6% of the
cases), 2 = Black (23%), 3 = American Indian/Alaskan Native (0.6%), 4 = Asian (0.4%)
and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (0%), with the rest of the cases coded as missing.
The race of arrestee variable does not report information on Hispanic arrestees. The
second is “ethnicity of arrestee”, coded as 1 = Hispanic (4.9%) and 0 = not Hispanic
(54.3%), with the rest of the cases coded as missing. See generally infra Figure 1.
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variable).36 This would result in these arrestees being over-counted,
thereby skewing the results. To avoid over-counting, one must
construct a single composite variable out of the race and ethnicity
variables that uniquely identify arrestees based only on either their
race or ethnicity.
We constructed such a composite variable for our analysis to avoid
over-counting. This variable creates a unique racial and ethnic
identification for each arrestee along the following lines: “nonHispanic
whites” (49.2%); “nonHispanic blacks” (16.9%); “nonHispanic
American Indian” (0.5%); “nonHispanic Asians” (0.3%); “nonHispanic
native Hawaiian” (0%); “white Hispanic” (4.6%) “black Hispanics”
(0.2%); “American Indian Hispanics” (0%); “Asian Hispanics” (0%).37
The rest of the cases identified as missing.38 All arrestees with Hispanic
identifiers were then combined. The following bar graph shows the
proportion of drug arrestees by race for all the valid cases (i.e., when
missing cases are removed).39

36 Similarly, a hypothetical light-skinned Black arrestee may be identified as Black
in the race variable and as Hispanic in the ethnicity variable. Alternatively, a darkskinned Hispanic may be identified as Black in the race variable and as Hispanic in the
ethnicity variable.
37 See infra Figure 1.
38 Note that these missing cases are included in calculating these proportions.
39 Arrest data cannot be assumed to correspond directly to the actual level of
offending among each race or ethnicity, obviously. Arrest data is influenced by the
degree of police enforcement activity, which in turn can vary based on the racial
composition of the community being policed. Further data on this variable can be
found in our “Breakdown of All Arrestees Uniquely By Race and Ethnicity” files.
Kennedy & Unah, supra note 13, at tab 5.
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Figure 1.

II.

DATA ANALYSIS

This section proceeds in three parts: first, findings are presented as
specific to drug type; second, findings are presented as specific to
racial groups; and third, overarching observations are made.
A. Drug Arrests by Type
Any data set containing as rich a variety of variables as NIBRS drug
arrest data can be analyzed in multiple ways. One very basic piece of
data included is the type of drug involved. Understanding how often
we arrest for which drug provides an overview of how law
enforcement resources are allocated between drugs.
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Figure 2.

As Figure 240 illustrates, our war on drugs is primarily a war against
marijuana. Marijuana’s 71% share of drug arrests dwarfs all other
drugs combined. So, an important threshold point is that a typical
“drug offender” is much more likely to be a marijuana offender than
anything else.
Turning our attention to the remaining “hard drugs” also reveals
useful information. The different types of cocaine combined account
for almost half of all remaining arrests, and crack cocaine accounts for
about two-thirds of all cocaine arrests. Amphetamine (which includes
methamphetamine) accounts for only 6% of all drug arrests, and
heroin is only half of that.
With this overall distribution of arrests between drugs in mind, we
turn next to the quantities involved in each arrest for the five leading
drugs as illustrated in Figure 3.41

40
41

For underlying data, see Kennedy & Unah, supra note 13.
Id.
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Figure 3.

The most striking finding here concerns the very large percentages
of arrests for very small quantities. For the hard drugs of cocaine,
heroin, and meth/amphetamine, the plurality of arrests is for
somewhere between a trace amount and a quarter gram. These tiny
amounts constitute close to half of crack cocaine arrests (45%), heroin
arrests (44.1%), meth/amphetamine arrests (43.6%), and over onethird of powder cocaine arrests (37.6%). For each of these hard drugs,
arrests ranging from a quarter of a gram to a gram account for
somewhere between a fifth and a quarter of remaining arrests (from
21% for crack and meth/amphetamine to 24% for heroin). Taken
together, arrests for a gram or less of hard drugs accounts for
somewhere between three-fifths and two-thirds of all hard drug
arrests.42
To be sure, the potency and psychoactive properties of these
different drugs vary, as will be discussed in Part III, but the amounts
involved are nonetheless very small. Understandably, the quantities
involved in marijuana arrests are slightly higher since marijuana is a
“bulk weight” drug in which less of the drug’s weight overall contains
psychoactive properties.43
42

See supra Figure 3; Kennedy and Unah, supra note 13.
The primary psychoactive substance in marijuana is tetrahydrocannabinol
(“THC”), which is present in fractional quantities in a marijuana bud or leaf. See Asa
43
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With respect to all drugs, the quantities at the upper end of Figure 3
are also notably small. For marijuana, slightly less than one-third of
arrests are for more than five grams but less than 2% are for a kilogram
or more.44 For the four hard drugs, the percentage of arrests for more
than five grams ranges between fifteen and about twenty.45 Quantities
greater than twenty grams are between 5% and 10% for each hard
drug, and quantities greater than a kilogram are generally a fraction of
a percent.46 Overall, well over 90% of hard drug arrests involve twenty
grams or less, and less than 1% involve a kilogram or more.
B. Drug Arrests by Race
One way of exploring the role of race in drug arrests is through the
race of offenders arrested for each category of drug. Figure 4 illustrates
the racial composition of drug arrests by type of drug.

Hutchinson, An Effective Drug Policy to Protect America’s Youth and Communities, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 456-57 (2003).
44 See Excel Spreadsheet on file with UC Davis Law Review, tab 1, col. 11 (29.5%,
adding 8.5% for 5–10gs, 4% for 10–15gs, 2% for 15–20gs, and 15% for all amounts
greater than 20gs including 1.7% for amounts greater than or equal to 1kg).
45 Id. at tab 1, col. 3 for cocaine (20.9%, adding 6.4% for 5–10gs, 3% for 10–15gs,
1.5% for 15–20gs, 10% for all amounts greater than 20gs including 1% for amounts
greater than or equal to 1kg); col. 4 for crack cocaine (14.5% adding 6.1% for 5–10gs,
2.4% for 10–15gs, 1% for 15–20gs, 5% for all amounts greater than 20gs including
0.2% for amounts greater than or equal to 1kg); col. 9 for heroin (16.4%, adding 5.5%
for 5–10gs, 2.5% for 10–15 grams, 1.4% for 15–20gs, 7% for all amounts greater than
20gs including 0.5% for amounts greater than or equal to 1kg); col. 6 for
methamphetamine (17.7%, adding 5.7% for 5–10gs, 2.7% for 10–15gs, 1.3% for 15–
20gs, 8% for all amounts greater than 20gs including 0.9% for amounts greater than or
equal to 1kg).
46 Kennedy & Unah, supra note 13, at tab 1.
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Figure 4.

Whites clearly dominate arrests for meth/amphetamine, accounting
for almost 85% of those arrests. Similarly, they account for almost
two-thirds of heroin arrests. Blacks account for slightly over half of
arrests for crack cocaine, and Whites account for 10% more of arrests
for powder cocaine than Blacks. Hispanics, overall, account for
between 5% and 6% of arrests for each drug with the exception of
powder cocaine where they account for about 18% of arrests. Whites
also account for about three out of five marijuana arrests, with Blacks
accounting for a quarter and Hispanics much less.
A relatively straightforward picture emerges. Overall, marijuana
dominates all other types of drugs in terms of arrests. Blacks and
Hispanics are arrested disproportionately in terms of their share of the
overall population. The racial disparities involved are not as great as
those present among arrests for hard drugs. Whites dominate heroin
and meth/amphetamine arrests, but those drugs account for relatively
few hard drug arrests overall. Blacks, in contrast, dominate crack
cocaine arrests and are disproportionately represented in powder
cocaine arrests. One racial disparity in drug arrests overall may, then,
be at least partially driven by what drugs we arrest people for, with
Black overrepresentation driven by crack cocaine arrests and White
underrepresentation driven by the relatively low levels of heroin and
meth/amphetamine arrests.
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It would thus be tempting to think of crack cocaine as a “Black
drug” and heroin and meth/amphetamine as “White drugs.”47 The
picture is a little more complicated than that though.
Thus far we have examined what the Black, White, and Hispanic
“shares” are for each drug. A different way of exploring the connection
between race and drugs is to look instead at groups separately and to
examine instead what the “drug shares” are for each race. These
percentages tell you which drugs a member of a racial group is most
and least likely to be arrested for relative to other drugs.
Given the overwhelming number of marijuana arrests, generally, all
groups are most likely to be arrested for marijuana, with marijuana
constituting 75% of White arrests,48 65% of Black arrests,49 and 61% of
Hispanic arrests.50 Once one moves into hard drugs, however, very
different patterns emerge.
Figure 5.

47 See generally David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1283 (1994) (arguing that federal mandatory minimums for possession and sale
of crack cocaine are so harsh because the sentences are imposed almost exclusively on
Black defendants).
48 See Figure 5.
49 See Figure 6.
50 See Figure 7.
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Among the hard drugs, Whites are most likely to be arrested for
meth/amphetamine but roughly equally likely to be arrested for crack,
powder cocaine, and heroin. Interestingly, Whites are slightly more
likely to be arrested for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine or
heroin.
Figure 6.

Blacks, in contrast, are twice as likely to be arrested for crack
cocaine among the hard drugs than any other drug (24%: 11%).51 If
one combines crack and powder cocaine, then a Black person is seven
times more likely to be arrested for cocaine than for any other hard
drug (31%: 4%).52

51
52

See supra Figure 6.
See id.
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Figure 7.

Hispanics are somewhere in between Whites and Blacks in terms of
these patterns. They are not as likely as Blacks to be arrested for crack
cocaine, somewhat more likely than Blacks to be arrested for powder
cocaine, much more likely than Blacks to be arrested for meth/
amphetamine, and also more likely to be arrested for heroin.53
Hispanics and Whites appear to be equally likely to be arrested for
meth/amphetamine and heroin relative to other drugs for which they
are arrested.54
C. Overarching Observations
Putting these two different analyses together complicates any notion
of certain drugs being considered “Black drugs.” When Whites are
arrested for a hard drug offense, they appear to be most likely to be
arrested for meth/amphetamine. After that, Whites appear to be
equally likely to be arrested for crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and
heroin. So, while heroin and meth/amphetamine do seem to be White
drugs any way you look at it; similarly, Whites who are arrested for

53
54

Compare supra Figure 6, with supra Figure 7.
Compare supra Figure 5, with supra Figure 6.
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hard drugs are equally likely to be arrested for crack and powder
cocaine. It is just that we do not arrest very many Whites for either
drug, and both drugs constitute the largest chunks of all hard drug
arrests. So among all Whites who are arrested for hard drugs, crack,
and powder cocaine are just as much a White drug as a Black one.
Since we do not arrest Whites for crack and powder cocaine nearly as
often as we do Blacks, however, crack and powder cocaine appear to
be “Black drugs.”55
Given that close to half of all hard drug arrests are for a quarter of a
gram or less and that almost two out of three are for a gram or less,56
how do race and drug type relate to the quantity of arrest? Does each
group’s relative share of arrests vary with quantity? The following two
graphs display each race’s “share” of low quantity arrests of quarter
gram or less and of arrests for five grams or less. The graph also
includes the many drugs contained in the category described up to this
point as “other.” As demonstrated in Figure 9, below, arrests of five
grams or less constitute roughly 80% of all arrests for hard drugs and
about 70% of all arrests for marijuana. Comparing them side-by-side
allows a comparison between racial and ethnic patterns for quarter
gram-or-less offenses and offenses involving ten or twenty times that
amount.

55 What drives this disparity cannot be determined from the data, but it should
not be assumed that racial disparities in terms of how often races get arrested for each
drug are driven by differing levels of use. The fact that when Whites are arrested for
hard drugs they are equally likely to be arrested for crack and powder cocaine as for
heroin belies such a simple assumption.
56 See supra Figure 3.
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Figure 9.

This side-by-side comparison reveals two important points. First,
Whites dominate at both the low and high end of quantity for arrests
of the many “other” drugs that are seldom the subject of an arrest.
Recall that arrests for drugs other than cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and
meth/amphetamine account for only 3% of drug arrests. When those
arrests are made, however, Whites constitute between 70% and 80% of
offenders for all quantities except for Phencyclidine (“PCP”), where
Blacks constitute about 50% of all arrested. Second, the pattern of
offending described is almost identical at the high and low ends of
quantity for marijuana and the remaining hard drugs. Whites
constitute at both the low and high end of quantity almost 90% of
arrests for meth/amphetamine, around 70% of the arrests for heroin
and marijuana and slightly less than half of arrests for powder cocaine.
The only area where Blacks dominate is in crack cocaine, where they
constitute roughly 60% of arrests at the quarter gram level and
somewhat more at a higher level. Indeed, crack cocaine arrests for
Blacks is the only area where a noticeable difference seems to exist
between low and high quantity arrests, with high quantity arrests
being more than quarter gram arrests.
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This pattern remains largely unchanged as one moves up in
quantity.57 Figure 10 shows race and drug patterns for arrests ranging
from 10 to 100 grams.
Figure 10.

It bears emphasis that arrests in this range overall constitute an even
smaller slice of the overall arrest pie, even though the quantities
increase from the low to the high end by almost a factor of ten. The
racial patterns involved for each drug remain largely the same with the
exception, once again, of crack cocaine, where Blacks increase their
share of arrests markedly. Turning to the stratospheric level of arrests
involving quantities greater than 100 grams, a category that
constitutes a fraction of one percent, we see roughly the same pattern
although the Hispanic share of hard drug arrests increases noticeably
and the White share of crack cocaine arrests actually increases slightly.

57

Compare supra Figure 8 and supra Figure 9, with infra Figure 10.
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Figure 11.

So, the racial patterns for arrests for particular drugs do not vary
significantly with drug quantity, with the exceptions of crack cocaine
where Blacks increase their share of arrests noticeably as quantities
increase and of the incredibly rare arrests for more than 100 grams
where Hispanics increase their share of arrests across the board. To the
degree that one equates multi-gram arrests with selling and not merely
possessing drugs, these graphs do not suggest that Whites are not
involved in selling drugs. Whites appear to be just as involved in
selling the drugs for which they are arrested as Blacks and Hispanics.
The following figures illustrate this same point in a different way by
illustrating the distribution of different arrest quantities of drugs for
each of the five major drugs for each racial group.
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Figure 14.

So the source of the well-noted racial disparities in arrests appears
from the arrest data to be the allocation of arrests between different
types of drugs. Even if one were to make the extremely dubious
assumptions that arrests were made in a “color blind” way, with White
crack users and sellers just as likely to suffer arrest as Black and
Hispanic, one would have to make a second and equally dubious
assumption that the allocation of arrests between drugs is itself color
blind and reflects either differences in use of the drugs (non-Whites
use their drugs more than Whites use theirs) or that the drug-type
patterns of arrests are justified in terms of social harm (heroin and
meth/amphetamine, and powder cocaine do not cause as much harm
as crack cocaine). Suffice it to say for present purposes that such
assumptions are controversial at best and are probably not supported
by any available evidence.
Given that racial patterns of offending do not vary greatly with
quantity, what is the racial impact of arresting so many people for
such small quantities of drugs? Recall this Article’s finding that quarter
gram-or-less arrests constitute a whopping 40% of hard drug arrests
and that arrests between a quarter of a gram and a gram account for
another 20% or more, with the percentage of gram-or-less arrests for
marijuana being only slightly lower. One might not have much
sympathy or concern for racial disparities between multi-gram
offenders on the theory that such highly culpable offenders should be
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harshly punished even if the racial allocation of such punishments
might not be entirely fair. That theory does not hold up very well for
possessors of truly minuscule amounts of drugs, amounts that are
more consistent with personal use, shared use amongst a few people,
or a very, very low level of involvement in the drug trade. Figure 15
focuses on the magnitude of the impact of low quantity arrests on
racial disparities by comparing quarter gram arrests by race and type
of drug in terms of absolute numbers of those arrested instead of
percentages.
Figure 15.

What immediately strikes the eye, of course, is the way in which
marijuana arrests dwarf all others. Interestingly, the allocations of
arrests between Whites and non-Whites is roughly proportionate, with
Whites constituting about 70% of both the arrests and of the overall
U.S. population. The allocation of quarter gram marijuana arrests
between Blacks and Hispanics is less proportionate, with Blacks

758

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:729

accounting for roughly 13% of the U.S. population but 24% of these
arrests, and Hispanics accounting for roughly 17% of the population
but a little less than 6% of these arrests.
Given the greater legal consequences involved with arrests for
possession of even quarter gram amounts of cocaine, heroin, and
meth/amphetamine, however, it makes sense to focus more carefully
on the magnitude of the racial disparities among those drugs. Figure
16 removes marijuana from the comparison and scales down the
numbers to permit a more careful comparison of cocaine, heroin, and
meth/amphetamine.
Figure 16.

This figure captures most fully the way in which disparities in the
allocations of arrests between hard drugs magnify racial disparities for
these minuscule quantity arrests. If anything, the figure understates
this effect by dividing cocaine up into crack and powder cocaine.
Whites account for almost 90% of quarter gram arrests for meth/
amphetamine and almost 75% of quarter gram heroin arrests. Blacks
account for about 60% of crack arrests and half of powder cocaine
arrests. Overall, however, Whites account for only 54% of all hard
drug quarter gram arrests and Blacks for almost 40%. Thus, Blacks are
significantly overrepresented in the quarter gram arrest picture
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because so many more people are arrested for cocaine offenses (where
Blacks tend to operate) than for heroin or meth/amphetamine (where
they do not). Simply put, racial disparities in drug arrests would
reverse if we arrested as many people for the “White drugs” of heroin
and meth/amphetamine as the “Black drug” of crack cocaine — a
reasonable thought experiment given the relatively greater potency of
a quarter gram of heroin and meth/amphetamine than a quarter gram
of crack. As things stand, whatever injustice inheres in the practice of
arresting offenders for minuscule amounts of hard drugs falls
disproportionately on Blacks.
III. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF GRAM-OR-LESS QUANTITIES
One might assume that possessors of quantities as small as a quarter
of a gram of an illegal substance might be picked up by police but not
charged. NIBRS data, unfortunately, does not contain any information
about charging or disposition. As discussed in Part I, this analysis is
limited to those who were formally arrested. Those who were taken
into custody but who were not arrested are coded as such in NIBRS
but were excluded from the data analyzed in Part II. So, while one
might assume that possessors of minuscule amounts of drugs would
not be formally charged, the coding of the data suggests that these
gram-or-less offenders were charged.
Felony liability applies to those possessing a gram or less of hard
drugs or selling a gram or less of marijuana in most states.58 As the
following discussion will demonstrate, prison sentences are possible
for first offenders in some states and repeat offenders in others. While
a comprehensive analysis of all fifty states is beyond the scope of this
Article, gram-or-less liability for the fifteen states that mandate 100%
participation in NIBRS59 data is presented and compared to the ten
most populous states in the country for purposes of comparison. The
gram-or-less offender who accounts for almost two-thirds of drug
arrests is liable as a felon, with all of the life-changing consequences
that that status entails: loss of voting rights, loss of many job
opportunities, loss of access to many forms of public housing and

58

Infra Part III.
These states include those that report 100% of their crime through NIBRS to the
FBI: Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
and West Virginia. See Status of NIBRS, supra note 10.
59
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assistance including eligibility for student loans, and the possibility of
years of incarceration and thousands of dollars in fines.60
Analysis of the laws of the fifteen states in question proceeds in four
parts, divided by the illicit substance in question: (A) cocaine and
crack cocaine; (B) heroin; (C) meth/amphetamine; and (D) marijuana.
Overall, this Part illustrates how easily felony liability can be triggered.
A. Cocaine and Crack Cocaine
Of the fifteen states that fully report to NIBRS, only three — New
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Vermont — distinguish crack cocaine
from cocaine in their statutes, and only New Hampshire does so in a
meaningful way.61 This section, therefore, focuses on how cocaine is
sentenced with the understanding that both powder cocaine and crack
cocaine would trigger identical sentences in most instances. Any
instances where cocaine and crack are sentenced differently are noted
accordingly.
As Table 2 shows, nine of the fifteen states impose felonies for
possession of any amount of cocaine or crack cocaine, and six impose
felonies for possession with intent to deliver any amount.62
Many of the states that impose felonies for possession with intent to
distribute also do so for subsequent possessory offenses or possessory
offenses above a threshold amount.63 In the jurisdictions that do not
treat simple possession of less than one gram as a felony, all it takes is
for the individual to have two or more prior offenses of the same kind
or a quantity above a statutory threshold for a felony to be triggered
nonetheless. While Delaware and Vermont appear to be the most
lenient states within the sample by imposing a felony for simple
possession only when the amount held is more than five and 2.5

60 See Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence — Understanding Collateral
Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. 24, 26 (2013).
61 Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(I)(c)(1) (2018) (punishing less than
one-half ounce of cocaine with intent to distribute with a term of imprisonment of not
more than seven years, a fine of not more than $100,000, or both), with N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(I)(c)(4) (punishing possession of less than one gram of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute with a term of imprisonment of not less than seven
years, a fine of not more than $100,000, or both). While South Carolina includes a
different statutory sub-section for crack-cocaine, it punishes the substance identically
to cocaine for low-level offenses. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(A) (2018). Vermont
also separates out crack cocaine within the statute, but only distinguishes from
cocaine for sixty grams or more. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4231(c)(2) (2016).
62 See infra Table 2.
63 See id.
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grams, respectively, the overall trend is punitive.64 On the more
punitive end of the spectrum, four states — Arkansas, Tennessee,
South Dakota, and West Virginia — apply mandatory minimums for
possession with intent to distribute. Arkansas imposes a mandatory
minimum of three years for possession of less than two grams of
cocaine with intent to deliver.65 Tennessee imposes a mandatory
minimum of three years for possession of less than 0.5 grams of
cocaine with intent to deliver.66 South Dakota imposes a mandatory
minimum of one year for possession of any amount of cocaine with
intent to distribute.67 West Virginia imposes a mandatory minimum of
one year for possession of any amount of cocaine with intent to
deliver.68
B. Heroin
Nine states impose felony liability for possession of any amount of
heroin while the remaining six impose felonies for subsequent
offenders, those over a threshold amount, and those with intent to
distribute.69 The more punitive states are Arkansas, Montana, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Four of
these states apply mandatory minimums for first-time possession of
any amount of heroin with intent to distribute: Arkansas has a threeyear minimum,70 Montana a two-year minimum,71 South Dakota a
one-year minimum,72 Tennessee has an eight-month minimum,73 and
West Virginia a one-year minimum.74 Two states, on the other hand,
begin applying mandatory minimums on second-time offenders who
64

See id.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-420(b)(1), 5-4-401(a)(4) (2018) (classifying the
offense as a class C felony, the sentence for which shall be not less than three years
nor more than ten years).
66 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(c)(2)(A), 40-35-112(a)(3) (2018) (classifying
the offense as a class C felony, punishable by not less than three years but not more
than sixty years incarceration and an optional fine of up to $10,000).
67 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-2 (2018) (imposing a mandatory minimum of one
year on a first time possession with intent to distribute offender).
68 W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(a)(i) (2018) (classifying the offense as a felony
punishable by not less than one but not more than fifteen years, a fine of up to
$25,000, or both).
69 See infra Table 3.
70 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-424(b)(1), 5-4-401(a)(4) (2018).
71 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-103(2) (2016).
72 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-2 (2018).
73 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(b); 40-35-112(a)(2) (2018).
74 W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(a)(i) (2018).
65
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possess any amount of heroin with intent to distribute. Both North
Dakota and South Carolina give a second-time possession with intent
offender a minimum of three years.75 Interestingly, while the legal
consequences for heroin use remain severe, public health assistance is
significantly more robust than what was seen in response to increased
cocaine use in the 1980s or heroin use in the 1960s.76
C. Amphetamine and Methamphetamine
The breakdown among states punishing possession of any amount
of amphetamine or methamphetamine is the same as with cocaine and
heroin offenses, suggesting that jurisdictions often group the three
drugs together.77 Among the more punitive states are Arkansas, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee. Three impose
mandatory minimums for first-time possession with intent to
distribute offenders: Arkansas triggers a three-year minimum,78 South
Dakota one year,79 and Tennessee three years.80 Both South Carolina
and North Dakota impose three-year mandatory minimums for
second-time possession with intent offenders.81 As emphasized before,
these consequences can stem from one single act and yet manage to
follow the individual for the rest of his or her life, making even the
most normal tasks difficult.
D. Marijuana
Marijuana presents a different story. It is a more complicated story
because many cities and towns provide their own punishments under
local ordinances.82 This section outlines the penalties available under
75 N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23 (1)(a)(1) (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53370(b)(1) (2016).
76 See Andrew Cohen, How White Users Made Heroin a Public-Health Problem,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/crackheroin-and-race/401015/ (noting the radicalized nature of the occurrence of public
health intervention). For a more in-depth discussion of the different public approach
to heroin usage as compared to other drugs, see generally SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND:
THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE EPIDEMIC (2015).
77 Compare infra Figure 4, with infra Figure 3, and infra Figure 2.
78 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-420(b)(1), 5-4-401(a)(4) (2018).
79 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-2 (2018).
80 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(c)(2)(A); 40-35-112(a)(3) (2018).
81 N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(1)(a)(1) (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53375(B)(2) (2018).
82 See, e.g., CITY OF ANN ARBOR MICH. CITY CHARTER § 16.2(b) (2011),
http://annarborchronicle.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CharterNovember2011.pdf
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state law. Overall, the legal consequences and punishment for small
quantity offenders are less serious although still substantial in many
states; a function perhaps of the relatively recent shift in public
opinion regarding marijuana.83
Outside of possessory offenses, which are largely not subject to
felony liability except in instances of repeated offenses or especially
large amounts, more severe consequences become a possibility once
an individual possesses marijuana with intent to distribute.84
Punishment can become quite severe in South Carolina, where a thirdtime possession with intent to distribute offender is subject to a fiveyear mandatory minimum,85 and in Tennessee where possession of
more than one-half ounce with intent to distribute triggers a one-year
mandatory minimum.86 Still imposing a mandatory minimum, but a
comparatively lighter one is South Dakota, which applies mandatory
thirty-day confinement — which cannot be suspended — for
possession of one ounce or less with intent to sell.87 Because
possession with intent to deliver is often established through
circumstantial evidence such as having a large amount of cash on
hand, having a weapon, or by simply being in an “area of high narcotic
trafficking” these charges are often highly subjective and determined
on a case-by-case basis.88 NIBRS data does not include final court
dispositions. It is likely that some of the recorded incidents — even
those involving smaller quantities — resulted in possession with
intent charges if the factors described above were found to exist.89
Ultimately, although individuals included in the NIBRS data who
merely possessed small amounts of marijuana and nothing more may

(imposing civil infractions and low-level fees for possession and distribution of
marijuana in certain circumstances).
83 See Abigail Geiger, Support for Marijuana Legalization Continues to Rise, PEW
RES. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/12/supportfor-marijuana-legalization-continues-to-rise/.
84 See infra Table 5.
85 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(b)(2) (2018).
86 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(g); 40-35-112(a)(5) (2018) (stating the penalty
as “not less than one (1) nor more than two (2) years”).
87 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-7 (2018).
88 See 28A C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 474 (2018).
89 This conjecture seems consistent with explanations that other scholars have
offered for increased prison growth in the United States: felony filings per arrest have
increased. See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1237, 1248 (2013) (explaining the surge in U.S. prison population
across the past few decades in part by increased felony filings per arrest).
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not be subject to a felony charge, a finding of an intent to sell can
often trigger felony liability.
E. Summary
While this section’s analysis has been limited to the fifteen states
that currently mandate 100% NIBRS participation, a summary analysis
of felony liability in the ten most populous states suggests that the
felony liability for gram-or-less offenders is the norm. Table 6 below
describes such felony liability for first-time possession with intent to
sell.90
In sum, many of the gram-or-less drug offenders that appear most
frequently in the NIBRS dataset are subject to felony liability for their
acts and those arrested with hard drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, and
meth/amphetamine often face possible prison sentences. While one
might assume these charges were plea bargained, the very existence of
felony liability and the possibility of a prison sentence obviously
creates substantial leverage for the prosecution to obtain a plea on
favorable terms. So, the possibility of prison for such a small amount
could be expected to result in a plea to a felony charge and at least a
probationary sentence, assuming that mandatory minimums did not
require incarceration. That felony conviction, would, in some of the
jurisdictions described above, mandate prison for a second offense,
even a second offense involving an equally minuscule amount. Felony
liability for gram-or-less offenders, therefore, can be reasonably
presumed to often result in felony convictions. Felony convictions
both exclude offenders from normal participation in civic and
economic life and make eventual incarceration much more probable.91
IV. WHO ARE GRAM-OR-LESS OFFENDERS?
Who are these gram-or-less offenders who constitute roughly twothirds of drug arrestees and who suffer felony liability in most
jurisdictions? The first section of this Part estimates the dollar value of
a gram or less of the various drugs involved. The following section
uses ethnographies and other social science evidence about the illegal
drug trade to determine what role a gram-or-less offender likely plays
in the illegal drug trade overall. The evidence considered strongly
90

See infra Table 6.
See Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the
Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477, 482-87 (2009)
(summarizing research on disintegrative effects of felony conviction).
91
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suggests that gram-or-less offenders are either simple users or low
level, poorly paid employees of small groups selling illegal drugs.
A. The Value of Gram-or-Less Quantities
Evaluating the culpability of possessing a gram or a quarter of a
gram of an illegal drug requires assessing the value of the drugs in
question. The higher the dollar value of the quantity, the greater the
justification for serious punishment. Just as we distinguish
misdemeanor from felony theft in part by the amount stolen so, too,
does it make sense to take drug value into account. A person
possessing or selling drugs that are worth a lot of money is more likely
to be deeply involved in the drug trade and would need a greater
punishment to deter him. Value can also be understood in terms of
potency. An offender selling a quantity sufficient for multiple “hits” or
“highs” by either one user or a group of users is more criminally
responsible than an offender selling a quantity sufficient for only a
single use by a single person.
Reliable information about the dollar value of illegal drugs at the
retail level is hard to calculate for multiple reasons. There is no
“commodity market” for illegal drugs whose prices one can check in
the morning paper. Illegal markets do not advertise their prices for
obvious reasons. The purity and quality of illegal drugs vary widely in
the absence of legal regulation; prices also vary widely over time and
geography.92
The best source of information on the pricing of illegal drugs is the
President’s Office of National Drug Control Policy (“ONDCP”).
Fortunately for our purposes, the ONDCP issued a report providing
specific information about local drug markets in 2002, just before the
beginning of our period of study.93 That report was based on a
national survey of law enforcement officers, drug treatment personnel,
ethnographers, and epidemiologists that provides the basis for the
following discussion.94
Prices for drugs varied more for some drugs than for others. Heroin
varied the most. Generally speaking, the most common street unit for
heroin seemed to be between 0.1 gram and a quarter gram, with the
92 See MARCIA METH & REBECCA CHALMERS, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, PULSE
CHECK: TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE JANUARY–JUNE 2002 REPORTING PERIOD. SPECIAL TOPIC: A
LOOK AT LOCAL DRUG MARKETS 27, 37, 44, 51, 59 (2002), https://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED473558.pdf.
93 Id. at 1.
94 Id. at 7.
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price averaging between $10 and $50 depending on purity, although
doses of that amount went for as little as $4 and as much as $120.95
“Crack” was commonly sold by the rock — typically 0.1 to 0.2 grams
— for $10 per 0.1 gram.96 Powder cocaine purity varied widely from
40% to 90% in various areas.97 Powder cocaine prices also varied
widely with most gram prices hovering around $100.98
Methamphetamine gram prices were most commonly reported at
about $100, but they ranged from $20 to $60 in Seattle to $330 in
Chicago.99
Prices for marijuana ranged even more widely depending on both
type and potency. Common street units ranged from a gram to a joint
or blunt to a quarter or a third of an ounce. Prices for a gram ranged
from $10 to $20, for a joint $5 to $10, and $25 for a quarter of an
ounce was a common price for a quarter of an ounce, which equates to
about seven grams.100
Overall, a quarter of a gram of a drug seems to be an amount
appropriate for personal consumption by a single user for marijuana,
cocaine, and methamphetamine. The value of quarter gram amounts
seems to range from $10 to $50 depending on the drug, with powder
cocaine and methamphetamine being worth more and crack and
marijuana being worth less.
Ironically, heroin, the drug that constitutes the smallest share of
hard drug arrest overall is distinctly more valuable and potent.
Depending on purity, 0.08 to 0.1 gram of heroin could be enough for a
single use, although heavy users might require more. A gram of the
drug would seem to be enough to supply several “hits” lasting several
days or to a small group of people with a single dose. The duration of
the heroin high also seems to be longer so a single hit might last a user
an entire day.
One cannot help but notice that the most expensive and most potent
of the hard drugs is both the “Whitest drug” in terms of the race of
those arrested as well as the drug for which offenders are least often
arrested among the five major drugs discussed. Conversely, crack
cocaine, the “blackest” drug in terms of the race of those arrested (but
not necessarily in terms of the race of those who use the drug as
discussed above) is the cheapest and least potent of the hard drugs.
95
96
97
98
99
100

See id. at 27.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44.
See id. at 59.
See id. at 51.
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The quarter gram crack offender basically has a single rock that is
worth $10 or $20 and whose effect will last less than an hour, but he
or she suffers the same felony liability as the quarter gram heroin
offender whose amount is worth two or three times that and which
will last even a heavy user a day or more. Yet crack is both a much
more common drug of arrest relative to other drugs and a principal
cause of the racial disparity in felony drug arrests between Whites and
Blacks.
B. Assessing the Role of the Gram-or-Less Offender in the Illegal Drug
Trade
Assessing the role that the gram-or-less offender plays in the illegal
drug trade depends on understanding how that trade works. Two
types of social evidence will be discussed: macro-level social science
evidence that uses anonymous surveys and micro-level accounts of
drug markets at specific places and times given by ethnographers who
have embedded themselves with drug trade participants. The ONDCP
study provides no support for the proposition that gram-or-less
offenders are significant players in the drug trade in terms of the dollar
value of that amount of drug.101 As is discussed below, leading
ethnographic accounts suggest to the contrary that gram-or-less
offenders are either heavy drug users themselves, the lowest-level
employee of a very small group of drug offenders or both and are
arrested simply because they are the drug trade participants easiest to
arrest.
In general, the ONDCP suggested that the distinction between users
and sellers was blurry. Users sell, and sellers use, although this varied
somewhat from drug to drug. “Marijuana sellers are very likely to use
their own drugs, much more so than sellers of other drugs.”102 Crack
sellers are also very likely to use their drug.103 Powder cocaine sellers
often use their drug, and about one-third are very likely to use the
drug.104 Powder cocaine sellers were “more likely to use their own
drug than heroin or crack sellers.”105 More than half of respondents
believed that methamphetamine sellers were very likely to use their
drug.106
101
102
103
104
105
106

See generally id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 59.
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It is true that the amount of drugs seized at the time of arrest does
not necessarily correlate perfectly with the seriousness of the offense
or the offender. A high-level offender might be arrested on a
conspiracy charge, for example, but he might have never actually
possessed drugs. Similarly, an offender found with a small amount of
drugs might actually be a serious offender who was simply careful not
to be caught carrying large amounts of drugs.
That said, there is little reason to assume that everyone arrested is a
mid-level dealer, much less a kingpin. Ultimately, the assumption that
the person arrested is more than a casual user must be supported by
some sort of evidence, and the quantity of drugs seized is the most
objective of the level of involvement that a person has in the drug
trade. As discussed below, what is known about the drug trade does
not support the assumption that a person caught with a small amount
of drugs is a serious offender whose participation warrants serious
punishment. The sociological and ethnographic literature describes a
diversity of arrangements and practices at various points in time and
various types of community.
The likelihood that a gram-or-less offender is a serious criminal
depends in part on how illegal drug markets are organized. TV shows
such as “The Wire,” and other staples of popular culture tend to focus
on highly structured drug organizations. To be sure, such
organizations exist, but overall the available social science evidence
suggests that many drug markets are very loosely organized. In such
markets, numerous small groups are an entrepreneurial free for all.
Two types of social science evidence describe how illegal drug markets
work: national surveys and ethnographic accounts of drug markets
written by social scientists who spent years “embedded” with drug
dealers, and users. The picture that emerges from both is that while
some drug markets are highly organized (“Walmart” operations),
many others resemble ad hoc flea markets more than anything else.
Mark Kleinman describes prevailing beliefs in highly organized drug
markets as the “drug cartel” myth.
Popular lore speaks of cartels “controlling” the trade and
dealers operating drug-selling “monopolies.” . . . However, the
drug distribution system is not a centrally controlled
hierarchy . . . . Rather, markets for the major established
drugs . . . are highly competitive, with many tens, if not
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hundreds, of thousands of individuals and small dealing
organizations.107
Drug kingpins do exist, Kleinman notes, but they generally do not run
organizations that control distribution and sales from wholesale to
retail.108 Gram-or-less offenders are obviously unlikely to be kingpins,
but the loosely organized structure of illegal drug markets makes it
unlikely that kingpins even employ them.
At the ground level, Kleinman describes three settings for drug
transactions: individual transactions between individuals who are
friends or otherwise acquainted, the “pizza delivery” model where a
buyer calls or texts and the drugs are delivered to an agreed-upon
place where payment is made, and “flagrant drug markets,” where
buyers and sellers openly exchange money for drugs in public
spaces.109 While public attention has focused heavily on flagrant drug
markets, it bears emphasis that many drug sales take place between
users and not between “employees” of any groups as the following
discussion shows.
A similar picture emerged from a large-scale study of powder
cocaine users in the nineteen eighties.
The cocaine sellers we met were not from a different gene
pool, not very different from the rest of the users we talked to,
who were not very different from ordinary citizens struggling
through daily life. If our interviews are any guide, then
beneath every big-time dealer who may approximate the
stereotype are hundreds of small-time sellers who do not. In
large part what we found were people buying from and selling
to friends, usually in relatively small quantities, and often for
little or no profit.110
This study found that such transactions were largely incidental to
use and were exchanges between acquaintances, not arms-length
transactions between “buyers and sellers.”111
107 MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, JONATHAN P. CAULKINS & ANGELA HAWKEN, DRUGS AND
DRUG POLICY 55 (2011).
108 Id. (“Cocaine and heroin might pass through as many as half a dozen
distribution layers just within the United States. Dealers at the higher market levels
sell large quantities while reaping enormous incomes, so they might fairly be called
kingpins.”).
109 Id. at 63-64.
110 DAN WALDORF, CRAIG REINARMAN & SHEIGLA MURPHY, COCAINE CHANGES: THE
EXPERIENCE OF USING AND QUITTING 75 (1991).
111 “Almost anyone who uses cocaine with any regularity becomes involved in sales
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By their very nature, such transactions blur the line between
possession for use and possession for sale. Even those selling multiple
grams of cocaine often “dealed for stash.”112
This type of seller would buy small supplies — a sixteenth or
an eighth of an ounce (1.75 grams to 3.5 grams) — and sell
grams or parts of grams to friends for small profits. By adding
$10 or $20 to the cost of a gram or $5 and $10 to parts of
grams whenever they sold it, they would cover or subsidize the
costs of their own supplies.”113
Indeed, the study revealed “gram dealers” to be the most common type
of sellers who made very little money off their sales.114
While Reinarman’s interview subjects were largely White and
middle class, the distinction between drug user and seller seems to be
equally blurry in low-income communities of color. Terry Williams
studied crack houses and crack dealers in low-income New York
neighborhoods for a number of years. He described heavy users as
“going on missions” to earn money to buy drugs, missions that often
involved acting as an intermediary between an inexperienced buyer
and an organized seller.115
These ethnographic accounts of fragmented and loosely organized
drug markets are consistent with more systematic social science
surveys. The ONDCP’s 2002 survey constitutes a comprehensive
attempt to collect information about the structure of illegal drug
markets on a country-wide basis. According to that report, drug
market structures vary from city to city and from drug to drug. For
example, the market for heroin in some cities was decentralizing as
“users increasingly support their habits by selling heroin.”116 For
or distribution to some degree. Users often sell to defray the costs of their own
supplies, to get better quality drugs, or to assist friends and associates in buying
higher quality drugs at quantity prices . . . . We heard several accounts of waiters and
waitresses in bars and restaurants who each put $10 or $15 into a common fund to
buy small quantities to be shared. The member who had a good connection made the
buy as a favor for the group and more often than not took no profit.” Id. at 76.
112 See id. at 77.
113 Id.
114 “In general, they bought quarters and eights of ounces (known as eightballs)
and sold grams and multiple grams. Most worked out of their homes or places of
work, selling cocaine to pay for their own stash and realizing only small profits.” Id. at
90. Individuals dealing in such small amounts made little real profit. “Profits at this
level are usually quite small, $5 or $10 a sale, and it is usually not worth a person’s
time or effort to sell these amounts if he or she has any profit motive.” Id. at 93.
115 TERRY WILLIAMS, CRACKHOUSE: NOTES FROM THE END OF THE LINE 63-72 (1992).
116 METH & CHALMERS, supra note 92, at 3.
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heroin generally, the market structure ranged from highly organized
groups to small autonomous street cells to independent dealers.117
Sources in one city reported heroin addicts acting as “go-betweens”
who would work between the buyer and a driver.118 Street-level crack
dealers were found to be equally likely to operate independently than
as part of organized sales structures — unlike sellers of other illicit
drugs, who were more likely to operate independently.119 “Law
enforcement and epidemiological/ethnographic sources identify
powder cocaine sellers as independent twice as often as they identify
them as organized.”120 Methamphetamine sellers were predominantly
independent operators.121 Marijuana sellers were more likely to
operate independently than as part of organized operations.
The ONDCP’s 2002 survey reported that even those who work
regularly selling drugs often also use the drugs that they sell.
“Marijuana sellers were very likely to use their own drugs, much more
so than sellers of other drugs.”122 Crack sellers are also very likely to
use their drug.123 Powder cocaine sellers were “more likely to use their
own drug than heroin or crack sellers.”124 More than half of
respondents believed that methamphetamine sellers were very likely to
use their drug.125
Putting aside the possibility that the gram-or-less offender who sells
drugs may be little more than a “go-between” user himself, even
offenders who work regularly in the drug trade make far less money
than most people might imagine and fit only poorly the public’s
conception of a “drug dealer.” One study found that the “majority of
the arrested lower-level crack dealers . . . were employed in full-time
legitimate jobs but moonlighted as dealers to supplement their
incomes.”126 As the following discussion shows, open-air drug markets
in urban areas employ teams of workers who play various roles
ranging from lookout, to runner, to the person who actually hands the
117

Id. at 29.
Id.
119 Id. at 4.
120 Id. at 44.
121 Id. at 58.
122 Id. at 5.
123 Id. at 36.
124 Id. at 4.
125 Id. at 59.
126 See PETER REUTER, ROBERT MACCOUN & PATRICK MURPHY, MONEY FROM CRIME: A
STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 63-64 (1990), cited in
PATRICIA A. ADLER, WHEELING & DEALING: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AN UPPER-LEVEL DRUG
DEALING AND SMUGGLING COMMUNITY (1993).
118
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drug to the buyer. These workers by and large earn a salary that ranges
from minimum wage to that which might be paid an entry-level
worker in a low-paying, non-union factory job.
As numerous ethnographic accounts describe, the drug trade is
simply not that profitable for those most likely to be arrested. Sudhir
Venkatesh studied a Chicago drug gang over a long period of time and
earned sufficient trust to be allowed to examine a series of spiral
bound notebooks that contained the gang’s finances. He was stunned
to learn how little the gang members most likely to be arrested earned.
[T]he most surprising fact . . . was the incredibly low wage
paid to the young members who did the dirtiest and most
dangerous work: selling drugs on the street. According to [the
gang’s] records, they barely earned minimum wage. . . . [E]ven
[senior members of the gang], it turned out, made only about
thirty thousand dollars a year.127
Even highly successful drug rings pay those who run the greatest
risk of being arrested relatively little. The journalist Sam Quinones
described one such Mexican heroin ring that used the “pizza delivery”
model to great success but paid its drivers only a little more than an
actual pizza delivery driver might earn. Drivers carry balloons of
heroin in their mouth and are directed to buyers by dispatchers who
receive calls and texts. The money and drugs are exchanged in the car.
Each driver is paid $1,200 a week for seven twelve hour days, a wage
that works out to just over $14 an hour.128
Terry Williams reported similar findings among crack dealers in
New York. Even street distributors often struggled to make money.
[T]hey can easily owe more money than they can actually
make. The process of wheeling and dealing, learning how to
make money — and how to control one’s own consumption
— is an ongoing one. Some street dealers make no money at
all one year and are bringing in “crazy dollars” the next.129
The sociologist Victor Rios described his own experience “dealing
drugs” as a youth. He bought a lump of heroin with a friend for $50.130
127 SUDHIR VENKATESH, GANG LEADER FOR A DAY: A ROGUE SOCIOLOGIST TAKES TO THE
STREETS 256 (2008).
128 SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE EPIDEMIC 43-45
(2015).
129 TERRY WILLIAMS, THE COCAINE KIDS: THE INSIDE STORY OF A TEENAGE DRUG RING
37-38 (1989).
130 VICTOR M. RIOS, HUMAN TARGETS: SCHOOLS, POLICE, AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
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He and his friend broke it into ten smaller chunks, which they sold on
the street. After putting in two fourteen-hour days, they sold all ten
bags for $100. Rios reasoned at the time that they had doubled their
money, but two fourteen-hour days by two workers adds up to fiftysix person hours, which means that each ended up earning less than a
dollar an hour.
The criminologist David Kennedy recalls TV viewers’ reactions to a
drug sweep in Seattle. People wrote in arguing that the people
depicted could not be drug dealers because they looked homeless.
Guess what. Street dealers and gang members do look
homeless. They don’t work steadily, they get robbed, they get
arrested and can’t sell, they’re addicted and that’s where all the
money goes, it rains and nobody’s out buying drugs, the cops
are all over and nobody’s out, their connection gets busted and
things dry up.131
While the public attention focuses on those higher up in drug
organizations who do make large amounts of money, those most likely
to be arrested are those who make the actual sales on the street, and
they make very little.132 All in all, the ethnographic literature strongly
suggests that a person arrested for selling a small amount of drugs is
either the lowest level offender in an organized drug selling group or
simply a repeat user himself operating opportunistically as an
intermediary between an inexperienced buyer and someone who
works more regularly as a seller.

LATINO YOUTH 1-3 (2017).
131 DAVID KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF
VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 279 (2011).
132 And it bears emphasis once again, that many gram-or-less offenders caught
selling drugs or participating in drug sales might not even be regular employees. Terry
Williams described such “hangers-on” in one crackhouse he studied. See WILLIAMS,
supra note 115, at 83. Terry Williams studied crackhouses in the late eighties and
described the thin distinction between user and seller.
The stairwells are hideouts for many crackheads . . . . They are waiting for a
buyer to beg from, a stranger to steer, a scale boy who wants someone to run
an errand, a friend to complain to. Some are working as lookouts, pulling in
thirty dollars, two meals, and a gram of crack for a twelve-hour shift, but
most are “volunteer” lookouts, hangers-on waiting to seize some chance that
will reward them with enough crack to continue what one crackhead calls
“pleasurable suicide.”
Id.
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RECONSIDERING FELONY LIABILITY FOR GRAM-OR-LESS OFFENDERS

Proposals to legalize drugs garner attention because they are
dramatic. Marijuana has been legalized to various degrees in a number
of states, but neither the federal government nor any of the states have
seriously considered legalizing any of the four major hard drugs
discussed in this Article.133 What has received much less attention,
however, is a reasonable, middle ground position: reducing the
possession or sale of very small amounts of these drugs to
misdemeanor status.134
Where we draw the line between felony and misdemeanor liability
with respect to possessing and selling illegal drugs is important for
three reasons. First, felony liability carries life-changing consequences.
To brand someone a felon is to greatly reduce the chance that the
offender will ever successfully integrate his or herself back into the
economic, political, and social life of their community.135 Second, the
racial disparities evident in drug arrests and convictions make drawing

133 See generally Peter Reuter, Why Has U.S. Drug Policy Changed so Little over 30
Years?, 42 CRIME & JUST. 75, 78 (2013); Testimony of Jonathan P. Caulkins,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 9 (April 13, 2016),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Caulkins-2016-04-13.pdf
(“[L]egalizing hard drugs does not at present appear to be a viable option politically
within the U.S.”).
134 It should be acknowledged that misdemeanor liability itself has serious — albeit
lesser — consequences for many individuals. See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF,
PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE
INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and
Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953 (2018) (arguing that minor
misdemeanors trigger massive collateral consequences without adequate notice or
process).
135 See Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization
of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477, 482-87 (2009), and authorities cited
therein. When Philippe Bourgois returned in 2002 to the drug neighborhood he had
studied in the early nineties, he discovered that slightly less than half of the dealers he
studied got legal employment when the economy in New York picked up.

One dealer was a unionized doorman, another a home health-care attendant,
another a plumber’s assistant. Three others were construction workers for
small-time unlicensed contractors. One was a cashier in a discount tourist
souvenir store. Two of the sisters of the crack dealers depicted in this book
were nurses aides and another was a secretary. One of the women
companions of one of the crack dealers was a bank teller, another was a
security guard, and a third sold Avon products. One of the sons of the
dealers was a cashier in a fast food restaurant . . . .
PHILIPPE BOURGOIS, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT: SELLING CRACK IN EL BARRIO, at xix (2d ed.
2003).
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the felony versus misdemeanor divide fairly all the more important.136
Third, felony liability creates perverse incentives for prosecution and
incarceration at the local level. Misdemeanants are ordinarily punished
in the city or county jail at the expense of the local political entity to
which the prosecutor, and in some cases the judge, are politically
accountable.137 Incarcerated felons, in contrast, are typically sent to
the state prison at the expense of the state government.138 So, local
prosecutors and judges do not need to worry as much about the cost
of incarceration when charging and sentencing drug offenders who
qualify as felons. The same could be said, of course, of all felonies. But
the problem of perverse incentives is particularly acute in the area of
drug crime where local prosecutors and judges may be tempted to
offload to the state prison system repeat drug offenders who constitute
not a threat to public safety but a costly public order nuisance.
Reducing gram-or-less offenses to misdemeanor status might
encourage more serious consideration of whether a particular gram-orless offender truly required incarceration at all, much less
incarceration in state prison with serious criminals.
The arguments against felony liability for gram-or-less offenders are
relatively straightforward. The possession or even the sale of such a
small quantity does not cause any significant social harm and the
consensual nature of illegal drug use makes the blameworthiness
involved more suitable for misdemeanor liability. Moreover, felony
liability for such small quantities amplifies the discriminatory effects
of our racially disparate prosecution of drug crime.
The arguments in favor of felony liability for gram-or-less offenders
are more complex. One could argue that gram-or-less offenders are
indirectly responsible for the significant social harms that the illegal
drug trade creates in the aggregate. Such indirect responsibility
arguments assume that the gram-or-less offender is part of a larger
group that sells large quantities of drugs on an ongoing basis and hold
136 See generally MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN
DILEMMA (2011) (describing the racially disproportionate effects of drug enforcement
on people of color).
137 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140
(1991) (“It is likely that some tension is generated by the fact that the level of
government that is responsible for paying the bills for the upkeep of prisons does not
make decisions about the numbers of persons sent to prison or the length of their stay
there. To judges and prosecutors imprisonment may seem to be available as a free
good or service or at least may be viewed as the subject of a major state government
subsidy. This phenomenon . . . we call the ‘correctional free lunch’. . . .”), cited in W.
David Ball, Why State Prison?, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 77 (2014).
138 See id.
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each member of the group responsible for all the drugs sold. Similarly,
one might hold the gram-or-less offender indirectly responsible for the
violence that attends the illegal drug trade, even if the gram-or-less
offender does not participate directly in it. In a similar vein, one might
also argue that arresting on felony charges the “small fish,” gram-orless offender might be a necessary means to the end of catching the
“big fish” offender who does merit felony liability. Finally, one might
argue along similar lines that the social harms of the crack cocaine
trade in low-income communities justifies the disparate attention that
the drug receives from law enforcement and the racial disparities that
result.
This section considers these arguments in turn and concludes that
felony liability for the gram-or-less offender is not justified. Their
arrest does not decrease and may increase drug trade violence. Their
arrests are not part of a grand strategy to prosecute more serious
offenders. The resulting racial disparities are most likely simply a
function of how differently upscale and downscale drug markets are
policed.
A. The Argument Against Felony Liability for Gram-or-Less Offenders
Given that gram-or-less amounts are consistent with small-scale
personal consumption, felony liability for possession or even sale of
such an amount cannot be justified in terms of the harm caused by
that single transaction or the blameworthiness involved. With respect
to blameworthiness, the offender is selling his drug to a willing buyer
in a society that worships both consumer choice generally and the use
of mood-altering substances more specifically. Illegal drugs are, of
course, deemed by society to be harmful, but so are many legal mindaltering substances such as alcohol and nicotine products. Some illegal
drugs may conceivably involve harms that are greater than those of
some legal drugs, but those harms are presumably known to the
willing buyer.
Switching to a utilitarian perspective, one might argue that selling
hard drugs is so harmful to society that serious punishment is justified
for selling even very small amounts. Small amounts of illegal drugs are
simply not sufficiently harmful to merit felony status or state prison
incarceration for an extended period with truly serious criminal
offenders. Hard drugs are harmful substances, but they are not
weapons of mass destruction. The amount of ricin that can be
extracted from a single castor bean can kill a thousand people.139 Hard
139

See Deborah Blum, About Ricin, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2013, 2:54 PM),
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drugs, on the other hand, are used to alter people’s moods, not to
harm them, and the incidence of a fatal reaction to a single small dose
is extremely low. For marijuana it is non-existent, and for cocaine and
methamphetamine, it is incredibly rare.140 Once again, the “White
drug” of heroin is the exception. A user with either a low tolerance or
a purer quality of heroin could overdose from a quarter of a gram and
certainly would from a gram.141 Heroin aside, however, the health
effects of a single small dose of the remaining hard drugs are usually
not fatal.142 Overall, the harmful health effects of illegal drugs come
from sustained use, just as they do with alcohol and nicotine products.
One might argue, however, that even a single dose of an illegal drug
is sufficiently harmful for felony liability to attach because even a
single use can lead to addiction, a condition that involves serious harm
for the user over time and great costs for society in the aggregate. An
instantly addicting substance would be akin to ricin in the sense that
even a tiny amount could seriously harm the user. Even hard drugs
such as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, however, are not
instantly addicting.143 To the contrary, the nature of a person’s
experience of a drug — including whether they become addicted —
depends upon a number of factors other than the chemical properties
of the substance itself, most notably the mindset of the user and
circumstances of use.144 Those who become profoundly addicted most
https://www.wired.com/2013/04/about-ricin (“The purified toxin from a single castor
bean, according to some accounts, is lethal enough to kill at least a thousand people
given an effective delivery system.”). See generally Ricin Toxin From Ricinus Communis
(Castor Beans), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://emergency.cdc.gov/
agent/ricin/qa.asp (last updated Apr. 17, 2013).
140 See generally CYNTHIA KUHN, SCOTT SWARTZWELDER & WILKIE WILSON, BUZZED:
THE STRAIGHT FACTS ABOUT THE MOST USED AND ABUSED DRUGS 135, 210-11 (2d ed.
2003).
141 See generally HOLLY HEDEGAARD, LI-HUI CHEN & MARGARET WARNER, DRUGPOISONING DEATHS INVOLVING HEROIN: UNITED STATES, 2000–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/
db190.pdf; Heroin Overdose, MEDLINE PLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/
002861.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 2018) (explaining that most people who overdose
are already addicted, but some people overdose the very first time they try it).
142 See KUHN, SWARTZWELDER & WILSON, supra note 140, at 135, 228.
143 See id. at 196 (“People who take opiates for a while (weeks) can develop
significant dependence and addiction, and undergo withdrawal when they stop”); id.
at 238 (“There are thousands of people . . . who regularly use psychomotor stimulants
but never develop a compulsive pattern of use [although] . . . [t]here is no question
that psychomotor stimulants are addictive.”).
144 “[I]n addition to the interaction between the molecules of the substance and the
cells of the human body, drug effects are shaped by the psychological mind-set of the
user — his or her expectations, mood, mental health, purposes, and personality —
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often do so because they use repeatedly under circumstances where
they are prone to addiction.145 Holding the gram-or-less offender
criminally responsible for the eventual or ongoing addiction of his
buyer is like holding a snowflake responsible for a blizzard.
Finally, comparisons of the blameworthiness and harmfulness of
gram-or-less offenders with other misdemeanor offenses suggests that
felony liability is not warranted for possession or sale of such small
amounts — even arguably for heroin. No one should sell harmful
mood-altering substances, even in small amounts, but there are many
activities that the law forbids which it does not criminalize and still
many more offenses that are formally criminalized but weakly
enforced and yet still other offenses that are simply prosecuted as
misdemeanors. Illegally downloading a copyrighted song violates civil
law, for example, but one must illegally download more than one
thousand dollars of copyrighted material within a six-month period of
time before one commits a criminal violation of the federal copyright
statute.146 Speeding in the aggregate costs thousands of dollars and
lives each year, but speeding alone is ordinarily punished as an
infraction. Even driving while impaired, an activity widely recognized
as both highly blameworthy and dangerous, is punishable only as a
misdemeanor as a first — and often even as a second — offense.
The unfairness of prosecuting the possession or sale of a gram or
less of an illegal drug is even more noticeable when compared to
malum in se offenses. Stealing property worth less than $1,000 is
routinely prosecuted as a misdemeanor in most jurisdictions147 yet
selling $25 worth of a mood-altering substance to a willing buyer can
result in a felony arrest in the vast majority of jurisdictions.148 In the
case of larceny, a person deliberately takes something from another
that he or she knows is not theirs and receives a misdemeanor. The
gram-or-less offender sells a mood-altering substance of relatively little
value as part of a consensual transaction and receives a felony.
Likewise, simple assault and battery is also a misdemeanor.149 Even
simple assault and battery against a domestic partner can be a
and by the social setting of use — . . . the social conditions that shape such situations
and impinge upon the users, and the historically and culturally specific meanings and
motives used to interpret drug effects.” CRAIG REINARMAN & HARRY G. LEVINE, CRACK
IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS & SOCIAL JUSTICE 9 (1997).
145 Id. at 9-10.
146 17 U.S.C. 506(a)(1)(B) (2018).
147 See WAYNE R. LEFAVE, 3 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 19.4(b) (3d ed. 2018).
148 See infra Part III.
149 WAYNE R. LEFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.1 (3d ed. 2018) (“Assault
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misdemeanor.150 So one could punch the next person one sees in the
face for no good reason and receive a misdemeanor, but if one sold
that person a single dose of a mood-altering substance one would
receive a felony. Once again, the single dose sold might not produce a
harmful effect in and of itself although it may contribute to cumulative
harm if the buyer continues to use. A punch, in contrast, produces
immediate harm and one that may also entail cumulative effects in the
case of a victim who suffers repeated assaults. That harm, moreover, is
not chosen by the victim, unlike the willing buyer in a drug
transaction.
There are, of course, sound reasons why we do not ordinarily
impose felony liability for larceny or simple battery, even though
many thieves and batterers are recidivists.151 Felony liability marks a
person as a serious criminal and effectively sets them apart from others
in society in ways that are significant and lasting.152 For those reasons,
felony liability is reserved for more serious crimes. The point is that a
single incident of gram-or-less possession or sale of an illegal drug is
no more deserving of felony liability — and arguably is less deserving
— than one who commits a misdemeanor act of violence or theft.
Given that those arrested with gram-or-less amounts of drugs are
most likely addicts or very low-level employees of a drug group, felony
liability for such low-level involvement cannot be justified. Felony
liability “dis-integrates” the offender from family, community, and
ultimately society by marking the offender as a serious criminal.153
The imposition of a felony conviction carries many serious collateral
consequences which greatly reduce the chance that the offender will
ever again be a productive member of society. Actual incarceration
further dis-integrates the offender by removing them from family and
community life and by marking them as and socializing them with
more serious criminal offenders.

and battery, which were common-law misdemeanors, today exist as statutory crimes
in all American jurisdictions. Simple assault and simple battery are punishable
(generally as misdemeanors) under all the American criminal codes.”).
150 CECILY FUHR ET AL., 42 CORPIS JURIS SECUNDUM INDICTMENTS § 342 (2018)
(“[M]isdemeanor domestic battery is a lesser included offense of felony domestic
battery.”).
151 See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2018 UPDATE ON
PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD (2005–2014), 10 tbl.6 (May 2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf.
152 See generally Kennedy, supra note 91 (describing obstacles to employment
education and participation in family life resulting from felony conviction).
153 See id. at 482.
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One could argue that all people who participate in selling illegal
drugs are sufficiently culpable and harmful to society to merit serious
punishment. But felony liability should be reserved for drug offenders
who are deeply enmeshed in a life of crime, who profit greatly from
the drug trade or who use violence. Such offenders do exist, to be
sure, and they may occasionally be arrested for possessing or selling
gram-or-less amounts, but the research discussed in Part IV suggests
that they are far less numerous than the low-level workers and addicts
who are routinely arrested.154 An offender who sells two doses of a
drug so that they can consume a third or who works long hours for
the same salary that they would obtain stocking shelves at Walmart (if
a Walmart job were available in their community) does not merit
felony liability.
One might justify serious punishment for sellers of small amounts of
drugs on the grounds that the drug trade generates substantial
amounts of violence. There are two problems with such a justification.
First, violence is incidental to the drug trade. Violence is not a primary
goal of the drug trade. Like any other money-making enterprise, the
primary goal of the drug trade is presumably to generate profits by
selling harmful illegal drugs to willing buyers. Violence is incidental to
that profit-making goal. In contrast, violence is central to a terrorist
operation. It makes sense to punish any participant in a terrorist
enterprise for violence committed by that organization because a
principal goal of such an organization is to perpetrate violent acts of
terror. It makes less sense to harshly punish peripheral or low-level
participants in a drug enterprise for violence they themselves do not
commit because while violence may be a frequent part of the drug
trade as currently practiced, it is nonetheless incidental to the purpose
of that activity. If those who ran drug enterprises could sell drugs
without committing violent acts, they presumably would do so.
Some measure of violence does seem to be an inherent part of the
illegal drug. Most of the violence seems to be low-level assaults and
batteries against customers or employees who are not paying or
earning what is owed or expected.155 More serious violence including
homicides results from robberies of drugs or money or territorial
disputes over drug markets. Finally, some of the violence resulting
154

See supra Part IV.B.
See, e.g., BOURGOIS, supra note 135, at 24 (“Regular displays of violence are
essential for preventing rip-offs by colleagues, customers, and professional holdup
artists. Indeed, upward mobility in the underground economy of the street-dealing
world requires a systematic and effective use of violence against one’s colleagues, one’s
neighbors, and, to a certain extent, against oneself.”).
155
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from the drug trade could be characterized as not just incidental, but
accidental in nature. It comes as no surprise that arming young lowstatus, easily offended young men with firearms to protect the drugs
or money involved in drug transactions results in these armed young
men getting into lethal conflicts, especially with one another. This is
especially true when one considers that those working in the drug
trade in many areas are often poorly educated young men of low social
status who generally constitute a relatively high proportion of
homicide rate as both offenders and victims.156 Serious violence
should, of course, be seriously punished, but punishing sellers of small
amounts of drugs as a proxy for violence is not efficient from a
utilitarian point of view. Rather than dispersing police and
prosecutorial time over violent and non-violent participants in the
drug trade alike, concentrated efforts to target violent offenders may
yield a far better return on the investment of limited time and
resources.157
Harshly punishing addict-sellers or street-sellers in a drug
organization on account of violence also violates basic notions of
fairness and has perverse, confounding effects. Much of the violence of
the drug trade results from the fact that we punish drug activity as
harshly or more harshly than violence.158 A drug trade worker who has
been robbed cannot report the event to the police without fear of
exposing himself to felony liability. Even if the police and prosecutor
promised not to arrest or charge for the transaction that precipitated
the robbery, the seller would have identified himself to the police, a
serious cost when felony liability is on the line. So, workers in the
drug trade who handle large amounts of drugs or money arm
themselves to protect against robberies since would be robbers do not
have to worry about their robberies being reported to the police.
156 See, e.g., DANIELLE SERED, YOUNG MEN OF COLOR AND THE OTHER SIDE OF HARM
(2014), https://www.vera.org/publications/young-men-of-color-and-the-other-side-ofharm-addressing-disparities-in-our-responses-to-violence (noting that homicide is the
leading cause of death for young black men aged 10 to 24).
157 See generally KENNEDY, supra note 131.
158 See ALEX ALVAREZ & RONET BACHMAN, MURDER AMERICAN STYLE 154 (2002)
(“[T]here is no conclusive evidence that any illicit drug directly increases an
individual’s propensity to become violent.”); id. at 155 (explaining that most of those
addicted to hard drugs do not commit crimes to sustain their addictions); id. at 156
(“[M]any people have experimented with drugs, sometimes often, and do not go on to
become addicts and perpetrate further criminality . . . . Drug trafficking is by all
accounts an extremely violent business enterprise, in large part due to the illegal
nature of the venture.”); id. at 158 (“[T]he penalties for dealing and using drugs may
be so extreme that offenders may become desperate to avoid capture and, thus, more
likely to resort to lethal violence.”).
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One further justification remains for arresting low-level drug
offenders. Such offenders might cooperate in the investigation and
prosecution of more serious offenders in the drug trade. There are two
problems with such a theory. First, many such offenders would
presumably not be formally arrested after being apprehended since
their formal arrest might signal a risk that they have been
compromised by police pressure to cooperate, a risk that would rise to
the level of certainty once the arrest did not result in the expected
prosecution. Second, there are nowhere near enough mid-level and
high-level drug offenders being arrested to justify either the
assumption that such a strategy is being pursued or that the strategy is
worth the cost. As Part II demonstrates, about 40% of arrests for hard
drugs involve the minuscule amount of a quarter of a gram, and
another 20% of arrests involve between a quarter of a gram to a gram.
Just under two-thirds of arrests then are either consistent with merely
personal consumption, a sale incidental to securing drugs for personal
consumption, or employment at the lowest level of a drug
organization.159 We do not seem to be catching minnows in order to
get sharks. We just seem to be scooping up minnows in the great
majority of the cases.
If the arrest of small offenders were part of a strategy to pursue more
serious offenders one would expect to see a substantial number of
offenders in the mid-level range as police seek to work their way up
the chain of command, yet the decrease in the percentage of those
arrested decreases precipitously as one moves up to larger quantities.
Applying Ockham’s razor,160 a simpler explanation emerges. Gramor-less offenders are arrested most likely because they are simply
“targets of opportunity.” Police arrest those at the bottom of the food
chain because they are the easiest offenders to catch and because the
law makes little meaningful distinction between the smaller and larger
offender for policing purposes.
Indeed, absent either an exceptionally dedicated officer or carefully
constructed institutional incentives to the contrary, catching the small
fish makes the most sense. An arrest by an undercover officer of
someone selling drugs on the street is easy and relatively safe because
the transaction can be covertly witnessed by nearby plain clothes
officers. After paying for and seeing the drugs, the arresting officer has
159

See supra Part IV.A.
The term “Ockham’s razor” generally refers to the idea that the simplest
possible explanation for something is to be preferred over more complex explanations.
Brian Duigan, Occam’s Razor, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Occams-razor (last visited Oct. 31 2018).
160
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an open and shut case. Alternately, if they find a small amount of
drugs on someone they stop and frisk, they have an almost equally
strong case with the caveat that the stop and search may raise Fourth
Amendment issues. Buying the drugs outside minimizes the risk. A
team of police officers can easily make such an arrest each day and
accumulate dozens of arrests in a single month. In contrast, cultivating
informants, developing probable cause for search warrants, and
building a case against those who operate the next level up might take
weeks for a single arrest. Yet the law treats each arrest as a felony
arrest for sale. The amount involved has little effect on the charge.
In sum, the best available evidence suggests that most gram-or-less
felony arrests are not part of a calculated effort to prosecute more
serious offenders but either a matter of happenstance at best or
malfeasance at worst.
CONCLUSION
The findings presented in this Article afford a starting place for
serious discussion of a major reform of our nation’s drug laws. Raising
the bar for felony liability above the gram-or-less offenses would be a
state-by-state project, however. Generating support for such a reform
would best be accomplished through the use of data specific to each
state, a goal easily achieved for any state that participates in NIBRS
reporting.
As discussed above, states have ample incentives to raise the bar for
felony liability in order to create a more functional set of incentives for
state and local law enforcement and prosecutors to make more
judicious use of the state’s correctional resources. In the absence of
action by a state government, however, local governments and law
enforcement agencies could exercise their discretion by simply not
charging such small amounts under felony statutes or by forgoing
such arrests altogether. Fortunately, NIBRS data permits the
generation of not just state-by-state data but even more localized
findings down to the level of each participating law enforcement
agency. As the consensus for more rationale and proportionate drug
enforcement policies grow, such granular data provides the necessary
fuel to energize these efforts on a city-by-city and county-by-county
level.
Such efforts require participation in NIBRS reporting by both the
state and by local law enforcement agencies. Such participation should
be mandated by each state. Tracking and publishing drug type, drug
quantity, and race in arrests should become standard practice for state
and local governments. Whether one views it as a utilitarian measure
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to measure the effectiveness of drug enforcement efforts or a human
rights effort to ensure that felony liability is reserved for the seriously
blameworthy, the time for requiring the use of such big data is long
overdue.
Ending felony liability for gram-or-less offenders may also be merely
the tip of the iceberg in terms of rational drug enforcement reforms
that NIBRS data could reveal. NIBRS data also contains variables for
the age and gender of the offender, for example, and some
jurisdictions code for whether a weapon was recovered in connection
with the crime. Moreover, NIBRS data could also be correlated with
information about the reporting law enforcement agency contained in
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(“LEMAS”).161 Such correlations might reveal which sorts of law
enforcement agency structures and programs result in higher quantity
arrests or less racially disparate patterns of arrest.
Exactly how and why we have spent billions of dollars prosecuting
drug crime and incarcerated hundreds of thousands of offenders for
millions of hours without keeping more careful track of whom we
were arresting and for what quantity is a question that may someday
puzzle future, more enlightened, generations. For now, using such
data to end gram-or-less felony liability is a good place to start.

161 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Series,
ICPSR, https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/92 (last visited Nov. 5,
2018) (describing the LEMAS series data collection, which contains information from
over 3000 state and local law enforcement agencies dating back to 1987).
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APPENDIX
Table 2. Cocaine and Crack Cocaine Felony Liability for Low-Level
Offenders162
Possession of
any amount:

Possession
with intent to
deliver:

Arkansas

Delaware
(any amount)
Iowa
(any amount)
Tennessee†
(any amount)
Vermont
(any amount)
South
Carolina
(any amount)
West
Virginia†
(any amount)

Idaho
Michigan
Montana
New
Hampshire
Rhode Island

Possession of
any amount
with a threshold
number of prior
offenses:
Iowa
(≥ two priors)
South Carolina
(≥ two priors)
North Dakota
(≥ two priors)

Possession of a
threshold
amount:
Delaware
(≥5 g.)
South Carolina
(>1 g.)
Vermont
(>2.5 g.)

South Dakota
Virginia
† mandatory

minimum applies

162 See infra Table 9. The only jurisdictions that do not impose strict felony liability
for possession of any amount are represented in the “possession of a threshold
amount” and “possession with intent to deliver” columns, due to the understanding
that the strict liability jurisdictions would impose felony liability in these two
scenarios as well.
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Table 3. Heroin Felony Liability for Low-Level Offenders163
Possession of
any amount:

Possession
with intent to
deliver:

Arkansas

Delaware
(any amount)
Iowa
(any amount)
Tennessee†
(any amount)
South
Carolina
(any amount)
West
Virginia†
(any amount)

Idaho
Michigan
Montana
New
Hampshire

Possession of
any amount
with a threshold
number of prior
offenses:
Iowa
(≥ two priors)
Tennessee
(≥ two priors)
South Carolina
(≥ two priors)
North Dakota

Possession of a
threshold
amount:
Delaware
(≥1 g.)
South Carolina
(>2 g.)
Vermont
(> .2 g.)

(≥ two priors)

Rhode Island
South Dakota
Virginia
† mandatory

minimum applies

163 See infra Table 10. The only jurisdictions that do not impose strict felony
liability for possession of any amount are represented in the “possession of a threshold
amount” and “possession with intent to deliver” columns, due to the understanding
that the strict liability jurisdictions would impose felony liability in these two
scenarios as well.
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Table 4. Methamphetamine
Offenders164
Possession of
any amount:

Possession
with intent to
deliver:

Arkansas

Delaware
(any amount)
Iowa
(any amount)
South
Carolina
(any amount)
Tennessee†
(any amount)
Vermont
(any amount)
West
Virginia†
(any amount)

Idaho
Michigan
Montana
New
Hampshire
Rhode Island

Felony

Liability

Possession of
any amount with
a threshold
number of prior
offenses:
Iowa
(≥ two priors)
South Carolina
(≥ two priors)
North Dakota
(≥ two priors)

787
for

Low-Level

Possession of a
threshold
amount:
Delaware
(≥5 g.)
South Carolina
(>1 g.)
Vermont
(>2.5 g.)

South Dakota
Virginia
† mandatory

minimum applies

164 See infra Table 11. The only jurisdictions that do not impose strict felony
liability for possession of any amount are represented in the “possession of a threshold
amount” and “possession with intent to deliver” columns, due to the understanding
that the strict liability jurisdictions would impose felony liability in these two
scenarios as well.
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Table 5. Marijuana Felony Liability for Low-Level Offenders165
Possession with
intent to deliver:
Arkansas (> 14 g.)

Possession of any
amount with a
threshold number
of prior offenses:
Rhode Island (> 1
prior)

Possession of a threshold
amount:
Idaho (> 85 g.)

Delaware (any)

North Dakota (> 28 g.)

Idaho (any)

South Carolina (>28 g.)

Iowa (any)

South Dakota (> 56.7 g.)

Michigan (any)

Vermont (≥ 56.7 g.)

Montana (any)
New Hampshire
(any)
Rhode Island (any)
South Dakota
(any)
Tennessee (>14 g.)
Vermont (> 28 g.)
Virginia (> 14 g.)
West Virginia
(any)

165 See infra Table 12. For consistency purposes, this table was converted to grams,
although the underlying statutes use ounces as a unit of measurement.

2018]

Sharks and Minnows in the War on Drugs

789

Table 6. Possession with Intent to Sell in the Ten Most Populous States
State

Cocaine
(Including
Crack):

Heroin:

Methamphetamine:

Marijuana:

California

Felony166

Felony167

Felony168

Misdemeanor169

Texas

State Jail
Felony170

State Jail
Felony171

State Jail Felony172

Misdemeanor173

Florida

Felony174

Felony175

Felony176

Felony177

New York

Felony178

Felony179

Felony180

Misdemeanor181

Illinois

Felony182

Felony183

Felony184

Misdemeanor185

Pennsylvania

Felony186

Felony187

Felony188

Misdemeanor189

166 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351.5 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)
(2018).
167 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351 (2018); PENAL § 1170(h).
168 HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11055(d)(2), 11378(5); PENAL § 1170(h).
169 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (2018) (not defining the offense as a
misdemeanor but stating that the offense is punishable by county jail confinement for
up to six months, a fine of up to $500, or both); CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (2018)
(distinguishing felonies from misdemeanors).
170 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(b) (2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.32 (2018).
171 HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.112(b); PENAL § 12.32.
172 HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.112(b); PENAL § 12.32.
173 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.120(b)(1)-(2) (2018); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 12.21, 12.22 (2018).
174 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 893.13(1)(a)(2), 893.03(2)(a)(4) (2018).
175 See id. §§ 893.13(1)(a)(1), 893.03(1)(b)(11).
176 Id. §§ 893.13(1)(a)(1), 893.03(2)(c)(5)
177 Id. §§ 893.13(1)(a)(2); 893.03(1)(c)(7).
178 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16 (2018).
179 See id.
180 Id.
181 Id. § 221.10.
182 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 570/401(a)(2) (2018).
183 Id. § 570/401(a)(1).
184 Id. § 646/55 (a)(2)(A).
185 Id. § 550/5(a).
186 See 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (f)(2) (2018).
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 Id. §§ 780-113(a)(31), (g).
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Ohio

Felony190

Felony191

Felony192

Felony193

Georgia

Felony194

Felony195

Felony196

Felony197

North
Carolina

Felony198

Felony199

Felony200

Felony201

Michigan

Felony202

Felony203

Felony204

Felony205

190

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03(C)(4)(a) (2018).
Id. § 2925.03(C)(6)(a).
192 See id. § 2925.03(C)(1)(a).
193 Id. § 2925.03(C)(3)(a); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2929.13(B) (2018).
194 See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-30(b), (d) (2018).
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.17, 90-95(a)(1), (b)(1) (2018).
199 See id.
200 See id. § 90-95(a)(1), (b)(1).
201 Id. § 90-95(b)(2) (stating that this punishment does not apply to the transfer of
less than five grams of marijuana for no remuneration).
202 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) (2018).
203 See id.
204 See id. § 333.7401(2)(b)(i).
205 See id. § 333.7401(2)(d)(iii) (not defining the offense as a felony but stating it is
subject to up to four years confinement), § 761.1 (defining a felony as “a violation of a
penal law of this state for which the offender, upon conviction, may be punished by
imprisonment for more than 1 year or an offense expressly designated by law to be a
felony”).
191
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Table 7. Breakdown of All Arrestees Uniquely Identified by Race and
Ethnicity

White
nonHispanic
Black
nonHispanic
American
Indian
nonHispanic
Asian
nonHispanic
Native Hawaiian
nonHispanic
Hispanic White
Hispanic Black
Hispanic
American
Indian
Hispanic Asian
Total
Missing cases
Grand total

Frequency

Percent
49.2

Valid
Percent
68.7

Cumulative
Percent
68.7

585,718
201,304

16.9

23.6

92.4

5,476

0.5

0.6

93.0

3,739

0.3

0.4

93.4

4

0.0

0.0

93.4

53,723
1,868
206

4.5
0.2
0.0

6.3
0.2
0.0

99.7
100.0
100.0

129
852,167
337,256
1,189,423

0.0
71.6
28.4
100.0

0.0
100.0

100.0
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Table 8. Breakdown of All Arrestees Uniquely Identified by Race and
Ethnicity with Hispanics Combined

White
nonHispanic
Black
nonHispanic
American
Indian
nonHispanic
Asian
nonHispanic
Native
Hawaiian
nonHispanic
Hispanic
Total
Missing cases
Grand total

Frequency

Percent
49.2

Valid
Percent
68.7

Cumulative
Percent
68.7

585,718
201,304

16.9

23.6

92.4

5,476

0.5

0.6

93.0

3,739

0.3

0.4

93.4

4

0.0

0.0

93.4

55,926
852,167
337,256
1,189,423

4.7
71.6
28.4
100.0

6.6
100.0

100.0
100.0
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Table 9. Cocaine (including Crack Cocaine) Laws
Jurisdiction
Arkansas

Quantity and Circumstances for Felony Liability
Possession of any amount206

Delaware

Possession of five grams or more207 or possession
with intent to deliver any amount208
Possession of any amount209
Possession of any amount with two or more prior
offenses210 or possession of any amount with
intent to deliver211
Possession of any amount212
Possession of any amount213
Possession of less than 0.5 ounces of cocaine214 or
less than one gram crack cocaine215

Idaho
Iowa
Michigan
Montana
New
Hampshire

206 See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-401(a)(5), 5-64-419(b)(1)(a) (2018) (noting that
possession of less than two grams is considered a class D felony, the sentence for
which shall not exceed six years).
207 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4756 (2018) (definining possession of a controlled
substance in a Tier 2 quantity as a class F felony); id. tit. 16, § 4751C(5)(a)
(categorizing five grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine as a Tier 2 quantity).
208 Id. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(3); tit. 16, § 4753(1) (considered a class C felony, with a
sentence of up to fifteen years).
209 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-2707(b)(6), 37-2732(c)(1) (2018) (punishing
possession of any amount of a schedule II drug as a felony punishable by up to seven
years, a fine of $15,000, or both).
210 IOWA CODE §§ 124.401(5), 902.9(1)(e) (2018) (punishing the offense as a class
D felony, which is punishable by up to five years incarceration and a fine of $750–
$7,500).
211 Id. § 124.401(1)(a)(2)(b) (punishing possession of 500 grams or more as a class
B felony, which is punishable by incarceration of up to fifty years and a fine of up to
one million dollars).
212 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(v) (2018) (classifying possession of
any amount less than twenty-five grams as a felony punishable by not more than four
years confinement, a fine of $25,000, or both).
213 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-9-102(6), 50-32-101(3) (2018) (punishing possession
of a dangerous drug with a prison term of up to five years, a fine of up to $5,000, or
both). Offenses in which the sentence imposed upon conviction is death or a state
prison term exceeding one year are classified as felonies in Montana. Id. § 45-2101(23).
214 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(II)(a) (2018) (classifying simple possession as
a class B felony, punishable by confinement up to seven years, a $25,000 fine, or
both); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. HE-C 501.03 (2018) (adhering to the federal
controlled substance schedules for classifying drugs).
215 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(I)(c)(4) (2018) (classifying simple possession
as a class B felony, punishable by confinement up to seven years, a maximum fine of
$100,000, or both).
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Possession of any amount for a second or
subsequent offense216
Possession of any amount217
First offense possessing more than one gram218 or
second offense possessing any amount219 or
possession of any amount with intent to deliver220
Possession of any amount221
Possession with intent to deliver any amount222
Possession of 2.5 grams or more223 or selling any
amount224
Possession of any amount225
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver226

216 N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(8)(b) (2018) (classifying a second or subsequent
possessory offense as a class C felony, punishable by a maximum penalty of five years
imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both).
217 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-1-2, 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i) (2018) (punishing
possession of less than one ounce with imprisonment for up to three years, a fine of
$500–$5000, or both).
218 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(a)-(b), (d)(4) (2018) (treating possession of more
than one gram as prima facie evidence of intent to deliver, which is a felony punished
by up to fifteen years imprisonment, a fine of up to $25,000, or both).
219 Id. § 44-53-370(d)(3) (punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine
of up to $7,500, or both).
220 Id. § 44-53-370(b)(1) (punishable by imprisonment for up to fifteen years, a
fine of $25,000, or both).
221 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, 22-42-5 (2018) (classifying simple possession as
a class 5 felony, which is punishable with five years in the state penitentiary and an
optional fine of $10,000).
222 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(c)(2)(A), 40-35-112(a)(3) (2018) (classifying
the offense as a class C felony, punishable by not less than three years but not more
than six years incarceration and an optional fine of up to $100,000).
223 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1 (2018) (classifying any offense whose maximum term
of imprisonment is more than two years as a felony); id. tit. 18, § 4231(a)(2) (2018)
(punishing this offense with imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to
$100,000, or both).
224 Id. tit. 18, § 4231(b)(1) (punishing dispensing with imprisonment of up to
three years, a fine of up to $75,000, or both, and punishing selling with imprisonment
of up to five years, a fine of up to $100,000, or both).
225 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10(e), 18.2-250(A)(a), 54.1-3448(1) (2018) (classifying
simple possession as a class 5 felony, punishable by not less than one but not more
than ten years or confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of
not more than $2,500, either or both in some circumstances).
226 W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(a)(i) (2018) (classifying the offense as a felony
punishable by not less than one but not more than fifteen years, a fine of up to
$25,000, or both).
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Table 10. Heroin Laws
Jurisdiction
Arkansas
Delaware
Idaho
Iowa
Michigan
Montana
New
Hampshire
North Dakota

Quantity and Circumstances for Felony Liability
Possession of any amount227
Possession of one gram or more228 or possession
with intent to deliver any amount229
Possession of any amount230
Possession of any amount with two or more prior
offenses231 or possession of any amount with
intent to deliver232
Possession of any amount233
Possession of any amount234
Possession of any amount235
Possession of any amount for a second or
subsequent offense236

227 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-401(a)(5), 5-64-419(b)(2)(a) (2018) (considered a class
D felony, the sentence for which shall not exceed six years).
228 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(6) (2018); id. tit. 16, §§ 4751C(5)(b), 4756
(2018) (considered a class F felony, with a sentence of up to three years).
229 Id. tit. 16, §§ 4205(b)(4), 4754(1) (considered a class D felony, with a sentence
of up to eight years).
230 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-2705(c)(11), 37-2732(c)(1) (2018) (punishing
possession as a felony punishable by up to seven years, a fine of $15,000, or both).
231 IOWA CODE §§ 124.401(5), 902.9(1)(e) (2018) (punishing the offense as a class
D felony, which is punishable by up to five years incarceration and a fine of $750–
$7,500).
232 Id. § 124.401(1)(c)(1) (punishing the offense where there is 100 grams or less
of a mixture or substance containing heroin as a class C felony, which is punishable
by incarceration of up to ten years and a fine of up to $50,000).
233 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(v) (2018) (classifying possession of
any amount less than twenty-five grams as a felony punishable by not more than four
years confinement, a fine of $25,000, or both).
234 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-9-102(3), 50-32-101(6) (2018) (punishing possession
of a dangerous drug with a prison term of up to five years, a fine of up to $5,000, or
both). Offenses in which the sentence imposed upon conviction is death or a state
prison term exceeding one year are classified as felonies in Montana. Id. § 45-2101(23) (2018).
235 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-B:26(II)(a), 651:2(III)(a)(2) (2018) (classifying
simple possession as a class B felony, punishable by confinement up to seven years, a
$25,000 fine, or both).
236 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-01(4), 19-03.1-23(8)(b) (2018) (classifying a
second or subsequent possessory offense as a class C felony, punishable by a
maximum penalty of five years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both).
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Possession of any amount237
First offense possessing more than two grams238 or
second offense possessing any amount239 or
possession of any amount with intent to deliver240
Possession of any amount241
Subsequent possessory offense when individual
has two or more prior convictions242 or possession
of any amount with intent to deliver243
Possession of more than 0.2 gram244 or possession
of any amount with intent to deliver245
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver246
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver247

237 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-1-2, 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i) (2018) (punishing
possession of less than one ounce with imprisonment for up to three years, a fine of
$500-$5,000, or both).
238 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(a)-(b)(1), (d)(4) (2018) (treating possession of
more than two grams as prima facie evidence of intent to deliver, which is a felony
punished by up to fifteen years imprisonment, a fine of up to $25,000, or both).
239 Id. § 44-53-370(d)(1) (punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine
of up to $5,000, or both).
240 Id. § 44-53-370(b)(1) (punishable by imprisonment for up to fifteen years, a
fine of $25,000, or both).
241 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1(8), 22-42-5 (2018) (classifying simple possession
as a class 5 felony, which is punishable by five years in the state penitentiary and an
optional fine of $10,000).
242 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-428(b)(6) (2018).
243 Id. §§ 39-17-417(b), 40-35-112(a)(2) (classifying the offense as a class B felony,
punishable by not less than eight years but not more than twelve years incarceration
and an optional fine of up to $100,000).
244 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1 (2018) (classifying any offense whose maximum term
of imprisonment is more than two years as a felony); Id. tit. 18, § 4233(a)(2) (2018)
(punishing this offense with imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to
$100,000, or both). The statute is written in terms of milligrams (200 mg.) but is
converted to grams in this Article for comparison purposes.
245 Id. tit. 18, § 4233(b)(1).
246 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10(e), 18.2-250(A)(a), 54.1-3446 (2018) (classifying
simple possession as a class 5 felony, punishable by not less than one but not more
than ten years or confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of
not more than $2,500, either or both in some circumstances).
247 W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(a)(i) (2018) (classifying the offense as a felony
punishable by not less than one but not more than fifteen years, a fine of up to
$25,000, or both).
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Table 11. Methamphetamine Laws
Jurisdiction
Arkansas
Delaware
Idaho
Iowa
Michigan
Montana
New
Hampshire
North Dakota

Quantity and Circumstances for Felony Liability
Possession of less than two grams248
Possession of five grams or more249 or possession
with intent to deliver any amount250
Possession of any amount251
Possession of any amount with two or more prior
offenses252 or possession of any amount with intent
to deliver253
Possession of any amount254
Possession of any amount255
Possession of any amount256
Possession of any amount for a second or
subsequent offense257

248 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-401(a)(5), 5-64-419(b)(1)(A) (2018) (considered a
class D felony, the sentence for which shall not exceed six years).
249 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4756, 4751C(5)(d) (2018); DEL. CODE tit. 11
§ 4205(b)(6) (2018) (considered a class F felony, with a sentence of up to three
years).
250 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4205(b)(4), 4754(1) (2018) (considered a class D
felony, with a sentence of up to eight years).
251 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-2707(d)(1), 37-2732(c)(1) (2018) (punishing
possession of any amount of a schedule II drug as a felony punishable by up to seven
years, a fine of $15,000, or both).
252 IOWA CODE §§ 902.9(1)(e), 124.401(5) (2018) (punishing the offense as a class
D felony, which is punishable by up to five years incarceration and a fine of $750–
$7,500).
253 Id. §§ 902.9(1)(d), 124.401(1)(c)(6)-(7) (classifying possession with intent to
deliver any amount of a mixture containing methamphetamine of less than five grams
as punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years and a fine of $1,000–
$10,000).
254 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.7214(c)(ii), 333.7403(2)(a)(iv) (2018)
(classifying possession of any amount less than twenty-five grams as a felony
punishable by not more than four years confinement, a fine of $25,000, or both).
255 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-9-102(3), 50-32-101(6) (2018) (punishing “possession
of a dangerous drug” with a prison term of up to five years, a fine of up to $5,000, or
both). Offenses in which the sentence imposed upon conviction is death or a state
prison term exceeding one year are classified as felonies in Montana. Id. § 45-2101(23) (2018).
256 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-B:26(II)(a), 651:2 (2018) (classifying simple
possession as a class B felony, punishable by confinement up to seven years, a $25,000
fine, or both).
257 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-01(4), 19-03.1-23(8)(b) (2018) (classifying a
second or subsequent offense as a class C felony, punishable by a maximum penalty of
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Possession of any amount258
First offense possessing more than one grams259 or
second offense possessing any amount260 or
possession of any amount with intent to deliver261
Possession of any amount262
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver263
Possession of more than 2.5 grams264 or possession
of any amount with intent to deliver265
Possession of any amount266
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver267

five years’ imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both).
258 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-1-2, 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i) (2018) (punishing
possession of any amount with imprisonment for up to three years, a fine of $500$5,000, or both).
259 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(B)(1) (2018) (treating possession of more than
one gram as prima facie evidence of intent to deliver, which is a felony punished by up
to fifteen years imprisonment, a fine of up to $25,000, or both).
260 Id. § 44-53-375(A) (punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of
up to $7,500, or both).
261 Id. § 44-53-375(B)(1) (punishable by imprisonment for up to fifteen years, a
fine of $25,000, or both).
262 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1(8), 22-42-5 (2018) (classifying simple possession
as a class 5 felony, which is punishable by five years in the state penitentiary and an
optional fine of $10,000).
263 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(c)(2)(A), 40-35-111(b)(2) (classifying
possession of less than 0.5 grams as a class C felony, punishable by not less than three
years but not more than six years’ incarceration and an optional fine of up to
$100,000).
264 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1 (2018) (classifying any offense whose maximum term
of imprisonment is more than two years as a felony); id. tit. 18, § 4234a(a)(2) (2018)
(punishing this offense with imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to
$100,000, or both).
265 Id. tit. 18, § 4234a(b)(1).
266 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10(e), 18.2-250(A)(a), 54.1-3448(3), (2018) (classifying
simple possession as a class 5 felony, punishable by not less than one but not more
than ten years or confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of
not more than $2,500, either or both in some circumstances).
267 W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(a)(ii) (2018) (classifying the offense as a felony
punishable by not less than one but not more than five years, a fine of up to $15,000,
or both).
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Table 12. Marijuana Laws
Jurisdiction
Arkansas
Delaware
Idaho
Iowa
Michigan
Montana
New
Hampshire
North Dakota

Quantity and Circumstances for Felony Liability
Possession with intent to deliver 0.5 ounces or
more268
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver269
Possession of more than three ounces270 or
possession with intent to deliver any amount271
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver272
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver273
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver274
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver 275
Possession of more than one ounce276

268 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-436(b)(2), 5-64-438(b)(2), 5-4-401(a)(5) (2018)
(considered a class D felony, the sentence for which shall not exceed six years). The
Arkansas statute itself describes the lower quantity threshold as fourteen grams, which
is approximately 0.5 ounces.
269 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(4) (2018); id. tit. 16, § 4754(1) (considered a
class D felony, with a sentence of up to eight years).
270 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-2705(d)(19), 37-2732(e) (2018) (punishing possession
of more than three ounces of marijuana as a felony punishable by up to five years, a
fine of $10,000, or both).
271 Id. §§ 37-2705(d)(19), 37-2732(a)(1)(B) (classifying the offense as a felony
punishable by up to five years incarceration, a fine of up to $15,000, or both).
272 IOWA CODE §§ 124.401(1)(d), 902.9(1)(e) (2018) (classifying the offense as a
class D felony, which is punishable by incarceration of up to five years and a fine of
$750–$7,500).
273 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(2)(d)(iii) (2018) (classifying the offense as a
felony punishable by imprisonment of up to four years, a fine of up to $20,000, or more).
274 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-9-103(3), 50-32-101 (2018) (classifying marijuana as a
“dangerous drug” and punishing possession of marijuana with intent to distribute with
incarceration in the state prison for up to twenty years, a fine of up to $50,000, or both).
Offenses in which the sentence imposed upon conviction is death or a state prison term
exceeding one year are classified as felonies in Montana. Id. § 45-2-101(23).
275 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B-26(I)(d)(1) (2018) (punishing possession with
intent to sell less than one ounce with imprisonment of up to three years, a fine of up
to $25,000, or both). New Hampshire considers offenses that are not statutorily
categorized as felonies as such when the maximum term of confinement exceeds one
year. Id. § 625:9(III).
276 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-23(7), 12.1-32-01(4) (2015) (classifying
possession of more than an ounce of marijuana as a class C felony, punishable by a
maximum penalty of five years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both). This statute
has since been amended in a manner that makes it unclear when felony liability is
triggered.
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Second offense possessing more than one ounce277
or possession of any amount with intent to
deliver278
Possession of more than one ounce279 or
possession of any amount with intent to sell280
Possession of more than two ounces281 or
possession of any amount with intent to sell282
Possession of more than 0.5 ounce with intent to
deliver283
Possession of two ounces or more284 or possession
of more than one ounce with intent to deliver285
Possession of more than 0.5 ounces with intent to
distribute286
Possession of any amount with intent to deliver287

277 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(ii), 21-28-4.11(a) (2018) (punishing a
second offense with twice the authorized term for a first-time offense, which is a
maximum of one year). Rhode Island classifies any offense punishable by more than
one year imprisonment as a felony. Id. § 11-1-2.
278 Id. §§ 11-1-2, 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(i) (punishing possession with intent to deliver
less than one kilogram with imprisonment for up to thirty years, a fine of $3,000–
$100,000, or both).
279 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-53-370(b)(2), (d)(4) (2018) (treating possession of more
than one gram as prima facie evidence of intent to deliver, which is a felony punished
by up to five years imprisonment, a fine of up to $5,000, or both); Id. § 16-1-10(c)
(2018) (classifying all offenses with a term of imprisonment of less than a year as
misdemeanors, which presumably makes the aforementioned offense a felony).
280 Id. §§ 22-42-7, 22-6-1(9) (classifying the offense as a class 6 felony, which is
punishable by two years’ imprisonment, a fine of $4,000, or both).
281 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1(9), 22-42-6 (2018) (classifying the offense as a class 6
felony, which is punishable by imprisonment for two years, a fine of $4,000, or both).
282 Id. §§ 22-6-1(9), 22-42-7 (classifying the offense as a class 6 felony, which is
punishable by imprisonment for two years, a fine of $4,000, or both).
283 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(g)(1), 40-35-111(b)(5) (2018) (classifying the
offense as a class E felony, punishable by not less than one year but not more than six
years’ incarceration and an optional fine of up to $5,000).
284 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1 (2018) (classifying any offense whose maximum term
of imprisonment is more than two years as a felony); Id. tit. 18, § 4230(a)(2)
(punishing this offense with imprisonment for up to three years, a fine of up to
$10,000, or both).
285 Id. tit. 18, § 4230(b)(2) (punishing this offense with imprisonment for up to
five years, a fine of up to $100,000, or both).
286 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10(e), 18.2-248.1(a)(2) (2018) (classifying this offense
as a class 5 felony, punishable by not less than one but not more than ten years and a
fine of up to $2,500 with suspended sentences available in certain circumstances).
287 W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(a)(ii) (2018) (classifying the offense as a felony
punishable by not less than one but not more than five years, a fine of up to $15,000,
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